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Abstract
A GENETIC GAME OF TRADE, GROWTH AND
EXTERNALITIES
Süheyla Özyildirim 
Ph.D. Thesis in Economics 
Supervisor: Professor Nedim M. Alemdar 
February 1997
This dissertation introduces a new adaptive search algorithm, Genetic Algorithm 
(GA), for dynamic game applications. Since GAs require little knowledge of the 
problem itself, computations based on these algorithms are very attractive for opti­
mizing complex dynamic structures. Part one discusses GA in general, and dynamic 
game applications in particular. Part two is comprised of three essays on computa­
tional economics. In Chapter one, a genetic algorithm is developed to approximate 
open-loop Nash equilibria in non-linear difference games of fixed duration. Two 
sample problems are provided to verify the success of the algorithm. Chapter two 
covers discrete-time dynamic games with more than two conflicting parties. In games 
with more than two players, there arises the possibility of coalitions among groups 
of players. A three-country, two-bloc trade model analyzes the impact of coalition 
formation on optimal policies. Chapter three extends GA further to solve open-loop 
differential games of infinite duration. In a dynamic North/South trade game with 
transboundary knowledge spillover and local pollution optimal policies are searched. 
Cooperative and noncooperative modes of behavior are considered to address the 
welfare effects of pollution and knowledge externalities.
K eyw ords: Genetic Algorithm, Dynamic Games, North/South Trade, Externali­
ties.
öz
t i c a r e t , b ü y ü m e  v e  DIŞSALLIK ÜZERİNE 
GENETİK BİR OYUN
Süheyla Ozyıldırım 
Ekonomi Doktora Tezi 
Tez yöneticisi: Profesör Nedim M. Alemdar 
Şubat 1997
Bu doktora tezi dinamik oyun uygulamaları için uyum kabiliyetli yeni bir arama algo­
ritmasını, Genetik Algoritmayı (GA) tanıtmaktadır. Genetik algoritmalar problemin 
kendisi hakkında az bilgiye ihtiyaç duyduğundan, bu algoritmalara dayanan çözümler 
karmaşık dinamik yapıların optimizasyonu için çok caziptirler. İlk bölüm genel 
olarak GA’yı, özel olarak da dinamik oyun uygulamalarını tartışmaktadır. Bölüm 
iki, sayısal çözüm uygulamalı ekonomi üzerine üç makaleden oluşur. İlk makalede 
doğrusal olmayan fasılalı sabit süreli oyunların takribi açık-döngü Nash dengelerini 
bulan genetik algoritma geliştirilmiştir. Algoritmanın doğruluğunu ispatlamak için 
iki örnek problem de verilmiştir, ikinci makale, birbirleri ile çatışan ikiden fazla 
grubun fasılalı dinamik oyunlarmi kapsar, ikiden fazla oyunculu oyunlarda, oyuncu­
lar arasındaki koalisyon olasılığı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Uç-ülke, iki-bloklu ticaret mod­
eli ile koalisyon teşkilinin optimal politikalar üzerindeki etkileri de bu makalede in­
celenmiştir. Üçüncü makalede sonsuz süreli açık-döngü diferensiyal oyunları çözmek 
için genetik algoritmanın kapsamı daha da genişletilmiştir. Burada sınırları aşan 
bilgi akışı ve yerel hava kirliliği olan dinamik Kuzey/Güney ticaret oyununda op­
timal politikalar aranmıştır. Hava kirliliği ve bilgi dişsalhğmın, refah üzerindeki 
etkilerine, işbirliği yapılmayan ve yapılan davranış biçimlerinde incelenmiştir.
A nahtar Sözcükler: Genetik Algoritma, Dinamik Oyunlar, Kuzey/Güney ticareti. 
Dışsallık.
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Part I
Introduction
The unifying theme in this dissertation is the development of Genetic Algorithm for 
dynamic game applications. Ever since the study of differential games was launched 
by Isaacs (1954), a plethora of literature emerged many studies on the subject have 
appeared, but very little attention has been given to the development of compu­
tational techniques to solve such problems. Prior to the 1975 work by Pau, all 
known references have investigated open-loop controls based upon necessary Nash 
equilibrium conditions, and the literature on the computation of Nash equilibriums 
in non-linear non-zero sum differential games contains even fewer studies.
There are basically three main ingredients in an optimization theory, whether 
static or dynamic: the criterion function, the controller (player), and the information 
available to the controller. For traditional control theory, all ingredients are singular 
in the sense that there is only one criterion, one controller coordinating all actions and 
one information set available to controller. But it is possible to conceive, situations 
in which there are more than one performance measure, more than one controller 
(player) operating with or without coordination from others, and finally two or more 
controllers who may or may not have the same information set available to them. 
The cases of more than one players with conflicting purposes are characterized as 
games. Thus, dynamic game theory provides a framework for quantitative modeling 
and analysis of the interactions among economic agents over time.
The solution concepts directly suggest the mathematical or numerical tools under 
various information structures. All these involve optimization of functionals either 
over time or stagewise at each point in time. The former requires direct application 
of optimal control theory (specifically the minimum principle of Pontryagin) which 
amounts to derivation of conditions for open-loop Nash equilibria in the context of 
dynamic game theory. The discrete counter-part of the minimum principle is likewise 
applicable to open-loop Nash equilibria of multi-stage (discrete-time) games. In both
cases, each player faces a standard optimal control problem, which are arrived at 
by fixing the other players’ policies as some arbitrary functions. In principle, the 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions for open-loop Nash equilibria can be obtained 
by listing down the conditions required by each optimal control problem and then 
requiring that all these be satisfied simultaneously. Because of the couplings that 
exist between these various conditions, each one corresponding to the optimal control 
problem faced by one player, to solve the corresponding equilibria analytically or 
numerically is several orders of magnitude more difficult than to solve optimal control 
problems. Very few closed-form solutions exist for these game problems, one of which 
pertains to the case when performance criteria are quadratic and the state equation 
is linear (Başar 1986):
The need to solve optimization problems arises in one form or other in almost all 
fields. As a consequence, enormous amount of effort has gone into developing both 
analytical and numerical optimization techniques. So, these kind of assumptions on 
the functional representations of the equations are now unnecessary and unrealistic. 
There is a large class of interesting problems for which no reasonably fast algorithms 
have been developed. As a consequence, there is a continuing search for new and 
more robust optimization techniques capable of handling such problems. For some 
complex optimization problems, we have seen increasing interest in probabilistic 
algorithms including Genetic Algorithm (GA). GAs are stochastic algorithms whose 
search methods model some natural phenomena: genetic inheritance and Darwinian 
strife for survival.
Genetic Algorithms were developed by Holland in 1975 as a way of studying 
adaptation, optimization, and learning. They are modeled on the processes of evo­
lutionary genetics. A basic GA manipulates a set of structures, called population. 
Structures are usually coded as strings of characters drawn from some finite alphabet 
often binary. Whatever the interpretation, each string is assigned a measure of per­
formance called its fitness, based on the performance of the corresponding structure 
in its environment. The GA manipulates this population in order to produce a new 
population that is better adapted to the environment. It is proved that GAs are pow­
erful techniques for locating improvements in complicated high-dimensional spaces. 
They exploit the mutual information inherent in the population, rather than simply 
trying to exploit the best individual in the population. Thus, Holland’s schema theo-
rem puts the theory of genetic algorithms on rigorous footing by calculating a bound 
on the growth of useful similarities or building blocks. The fundamental principle of 
GAs is to make good use of these templates.
There are currently other so-called artificial intelligence (AI) techniques used for 
the design and optimization of control systems. Most widely used A I  techniques are 
neural networks, knowledge-based systems, fuzzy logic systems ans simulated an­
nealing. Knowledge-based and fuzzy logic systems rely on a priori knowledge of the 
problem to be solved and can therefore be classified under techniques that learn from 
past performance. On the other hand, even though artificial neural networks learn 
through repeated exposure to desired input-output relationship, GAs provide a tech­
nique for optimizing a given control structure whereas the artificial neural networks 
can only be an integral part of the structure. In other words, GAs can be used to 
design artificial neural networks but not vice versa. Finally, simulated annealing is 
a combinatorial optimization that recently has attracted attention for optimization 
problems of large scale. The difference between simulated annealing and the genetic 
algorithm lies in the fact that the GA focuses on the importance of recombination 
and other operators found in the nature, is better understood (Krishnakumar and 
Golberg 1992).
In this dissertation, we design and implement a numerical method called shared- 
memory algorithm using GAs for the solution of multiple criterion dynamic optimiza­
tion problems. In chapter two, the shared-memory algorithm has been introduced to 
optimize a complex system such as a dynamic game. This algorithm was designed to 
be used for the approximation of the problems which are beyond analytical methods 
and which present significant difficulties for numerical techniques.
GAs require little knowledge of the problem itself, computations based on these 
algorithms are very attractive to the complex dynamic optimization problems. Opti­
mal control problems which are one-player dynamic optimization problems, are still 
quite difficult to deal with numerically. Recently, Michalewicz (1992) used GAs to 
solve optimal control problems. The application of GAs to optimal control problems 
is the natural extension of genetic algorithms as a function optimizer. Besides, the 
use of this algorithm allows to solve a number of classes of control problems which 
require special techniques: One such case is that of systems in which have objective 
functionals that are linear in the control. The solvability of these problems is possible
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as long as control vector is constrained by the existence of upper and lower bounds 
on the control. There is another special situation which occurs when the objective 
functional is not continuous over some interval of the time (¿i <  i <  ¿2)· Since this 
causes the control to vanish in that interval, it is not clear how we can determine the 
optimal value of Ut over h < t <  t2 · The control over this interval is called a singular 
arc and these specially difficult problems are called singular control problems. These 
problems must be exercised with special caution in traditional approaches. However, 
as an adaptive search algorithm, GA is quite suitable for such problems.
Actually, as mentioned by De Jong (1993), GAs are not only function optimizers 
but they have learning ability which we use to solve open-loop difference games. 
Thus, in the game-theoretic framework, we used both the optimization and the 
learning property of GAs. Since GAs are numerical algorithms, in order to test the 
success of the algorithm, in chapter two, we applied the shared-memory algorithm to 
the previously solved open-loop Nash difference game problems. First example is the 
numerical example from Kydland (1975) and the second one is the typical example of 
policy optimization in a policy game given by Brandsma and Hughes-Hallett (1984) 
using the formulation by L.R. Klein to describe the mechanism of the American 
economy in the interwar period, 1933-1936. This chapter has been published in the 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics.
In chapter three, we extend the solution procedure for A^-player games. The gen­
eral differential/difference game has N  players, each controlling a different set of 
inputs to a single nonlinear dynamic system and each trying to minimize a different 
performance criterion. Although one naturally expects that methods for computing 
solutions to these problems can be obtained by generalizing well-known methods, 
several difficulties arise which are absent in control problems {N  =  1) and two 
person games (Starr and Ho 1969). On the Nash trajectory, each player’s cost is 
minimized with respect to his own control but not with respect to the other player’s 
controls. Because his cost is not minimized with respect to the jth  player’s control, 
the ¿th player is very sensitive to the changes in his rival’s controls. The importance 
of sensitivity increases with the number of players in the game. This is the causes 
of considerable difficulties in developing algorithms for computing Nash controls for 
nonlinear problems. Thus, when A^  > 2, as is usually the case in the nonlinear 
problems, the complexity increases more than twice. Also, the most important phe-
nomenon arising in the extension from two players to N  players is the possibility of 
coalitions among groups of players. Very little can be said unless strict rules gov­
erning coalition formation are postulated. One special case, a single coalition of all 
players (the so-called pareto optimal solution) is studied in the fourth chapter. In 
this chapter, we extend the shared memory algorithm for the open-loop solutions for 
N > 2  games. The algorithm is applied to a three-country, two-bloc trade model in 
the same vein as Galor (1986). This chapter has been published in the Computers 
and Mathematics with Applications.
In an increasingly complex and integrated world economy, international and inter­
regional economic interactions have been an issue of public policy for a long time. Of 
growing interest is a particular set of problems characterized by externalities between 
countries and regions arising through trade relations. One set of issues involves the 
local pollution generated while extracting tradable raw materials. Another prob­
lem, which will become increasingly important as knowledge spillover, involves the 
recovery of the effect of pollution. A common feature of these issues is that the 
welfare of one country depends upon the economic behavior of a foreign country. 
Thus, one purpose of chapter four is to develop an economic model that incorpo­
rates the principal features of the various types of international externality problems 
outlined above. Specifically, the chapter deals with a simple pollution-knowledge 
model as a vehicle for coordination between nations. The model is constructed as an 
infinite horizon continuous problem which is initially discretized as a finite horizon 
dicrete-time problem and solved again using shared-memory algorithm. Mercenier 
and Michel (1994) propose time aggregation to discretize continuous time infinite 
horizon optimal control problems, and we extend their results to open-loop solutions 
with multi-controllers. In adressing trade and environment concerns, we used the 
North/South debate where the North has the technology and the South has the pol­
luting raw material. In the dynamic game framework, both regions are allowed to 
interact noncooperatively and cooperatively. This chapter concludes that a unilateral 
act by the North which lifts barriers to disseminate knowledge related to pollution 
abatement would be welfare improving for both regions.
Part II
Computing Open-Loop Noncooperative Solution 
In Discrete Dynamic Games
1.1 Introduction
Economics and other social sciences are concerned with the dynamics arising from 
the interaction among different decision makers. Their interactions do not always co­
incide; thus game theoretic considerations become important. Game theory involves 
multi-person decision making; it is dynamic if the order in which the decisions are 
made is important and it is noncooperative if each person involved pursues his or 
her own interests which are partly conflicting with others (Başar and Oldser 1982).
One might argue that ideally all economic problems should be modeled as dynamic 
games since each individual interacts constantly with others in a society. Thus, 
many authors who think in this way have sought explicit solutions to dynamic and 
noncooperative games (eg. Kydland 1975, Pindyck 1977, De Bruyne 1979, Van 
der Ploeg 1982, Miller and Salmon 1985). However, a closer investigation of the 
available solutions reveal that most are actually only optimal subject to certain 
simplifying restriction which permit the derivation of analytically tractable decision 
rules. Because of their mathematical tractability and the possibility of obtaining 
an analytical solution, the linear quadratic games are well suited for the purpose of 
deriving necessary and sufficient conditions for a noncooperative equilibrium.
In the last few decades, remarkable progress has been made in adapting con­
trol theory to economic problems; and the methods for computing solutions to the 
multi-person (A^-person) problem are obtained by generalizing well known methods 
of optimal control theory (Starr and Ho 1969). In the traditional control theory, all 
the ingredients are singular in the sense that there is only one criterion, one central 
controller coordinating all control actions, and one information set available to the 
controller (Ho 1970). On the other hand, one can also argue that this viewpoint is 
unnecessarily narrow. Surely, we can all visualize situations or problems in which
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there are more than one criterion or performance measure, more than one intelli­
gent controller operating with or without coordination from others and finally all 
the controllers may or may not have the same information set available to them. 
Generally, a problem of game theory is not merely a bit harder than its traditional 
one player counterpart but many times as hard. In the simplest terms, the former 
has a full, at least two-dimensional matrix; the latter, a single-row matrix. Besides 
there is no single satisfactory definition of optimality for these A^-person 3problems. 
Depending on the applications, various types of solutions are relevant (eg. open-loop 
or closed-loop solutions).
In situations where analytical resources fail to cast light, computational simula­
tions of a model can provide much needed clues to what constitutes the true behav­
ior of the system in question. This approach has had considerable recent success 
in many areas of the physical and biological sciences and in mathematics itself. In­
deed, whole areas of inquiry owe their existence to the careful examination of well 
conceived numerical computations (Bona and Santos 1994). The numerical methods 
were originally developed by control theorists and their chief interest has been testing 
their capability of solving moderate sized economic problems (Kendrick and Taylor 
1970).
Recently, economists are increasingly turning to numerical techniques for analyz­
ing dynamic economic models (Judd 1992). While the progress has been substantial, 
the numerical techniques have tended to be, or at least have appeared to be, problem 
specific. Hence, this chapter presents a new optimization algorithm as the numerical 
solution of noncooperative N-person nonzero sum difference games. Difference games 
are dynamic games in discrete time.
The task of optimizing a complex system such as a dynamic game presents at 
least two levels of problems. First, a class of optimizing algorithms that are suit­
able for application to the system must be chosen. Second, various parameters ol 
the optimization algorithm need to be tuned for efficiency (Grefenstette 1986). In 
this study, a class of adaptive search procedures called Genetic Algorithm (GA) has 
been designed to optimize complex systems such as noncooperative difference games. 
We will study open-loop Nash equilibrium solution and leave problems of stability, 
uniqueness etc. aside. The challenge in here is to introduce a general and efficient 
purpose algorithm to analyze more complex economic models.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Open-loop noncooperative 
notations and solutions are described in the Section 1.2. The Genetic Algorithm 
is introduced in Section 1.3 and the main numerical approximation algorithm is 
sketched out in Section 1.4. Numerical examples and their results are given in Section 
1.5. Finally, a brief conclusion is given in Section 1.6.
1.2 Open-Loop Noncooperative Solution In Discrete Dy­
namic Games
A solution concept from game theory that has been used frequently in economic 
applications is the noncooperative solution. Non cooperation implies that each player 
in the game maximizes his self interest subject to his perception of the constraints on 
his decision variables. Noncooperative equilibrium solutions to nonzero-sum discrete 
games were discussed in detail in Kydland (1975), Pindyck (1977), De Bruyne (1979), 
Brandsma and Hallett (1984) Karp and Calla (1983) and De Zeeuw and Van der 
Ploeg (1991) and also several I'eferences to literature can be found there.
The open-loop solution is a sequence of decisions for each time period and these 
decisions all depend on the initial state. The open-loop noncooperative solution 
presumes that at time 0, each player can make binding commitments about the 
actions he or she announces to undertake in the entire planning period.^ Each player 
in the game designs its optimal policy based on its own objectives at the beginning 
of the period and sticks to that policy throughout the entire period.
In the general A^-player, nonzero-sum difference game, the player chooses 
u,i,u,'2, ...,w,T trying to maximize (or minimize)
T
J i  =  ^  L i { u , w ,  t )
1=0
subject to
 ^Here, of course, the term “open-loop noncooperative” should be interpreted in a different context than in standard 
game theory. In the latter, noncooperative is used to imply the absence of binding commitments whereas in this study, 
we used the same term to describe that the agents have conflicting interests. The term “open-loop noncooperative” 
used in this study, however, implies only that the players with conflicting interests have the ability to make binding 
commitments.
Xo? 1^5 ···, given
where
=  {w \t ,  ■■■■,‘WNt)
is the player ¿’s expectation of the other players’ decisions. The possible inequality or 
equality constraints on the state and the control variables are omitted for simplicity.
Player i has control over u,· only, but he has to consider what the other players 
do in the game. Thus, the open-loop solution of the optimization problem for player 
i in period t is the solution of the above problem and solutions for each time period 
are N  mappings
xo,w \,...,w 'j^U it i =  l,...,N ]  i =  l , . . . ,T
derived from the first-order conditions for a minimum. The assumption of noncoop­
erative solution implies that
ut =  wt =  g¡{xo), t =
The quadratic approximation of the objective function with linear constraints 
has been- extensively studied by Kydland (1975) and Pindyck (1977). In previous 
solutions of open-loop discrete dynamic games, the solution methodologies depend on 
the assumptions that make the problem’s mathematics reasonably tractable. Hence, 
in almost all studies in this area, each player arrives at its decision using the same 
econometric model (i.e., each has the same view of the way world works), but has 
a different set of objectives, since the possibility of two players having the same set 
of objectives but each exercising control based on decisions arrived at using different 
econometric models, is not amenable to solution.
The general linear-quadratic dynamic games use the following procedure to solve 
such games: There are N  players, each with control vector ujt where ¿ = 1,2, ...,N  
and t =  The evolution of the state xt is given by the linear diflerence
equation
Xt =  A xt_ i -t- But -I- C
where Xt is K  dimensional and ut is N  dimensional. The objective of player i is to 
maximize (or minimize)
L ¡(xt,ut) =  J ^ (x ÍQ xt -t- u^Rut)
t=i
for all i =  The vectors and matrices A ,B ,C ,Q , and R , are given and
at an appropriate dimensions ((Q ) and (R ) are positive symmetric matrices). They 
indicate the effect on the current state of the previous state (A ), current controls 
(B ) and the exogenous change (C); (Q) and (R ) give the effect of the current state 
and the control on player i’s single period payoff respectively. The inclusion of the 
controls in the state vector allows the function L} to depend on both the controls 
and the state.
Since in general Lj /  Lj, the players have conflicting objectives. We seek a nonco­
operative Nash solution to this game by finding a set of N  strategies from which no 
player can unilaterally deviate without decreasing his payoff. Open-loop controls re­
quire that at the beginning of the game, each player determines his entire trajectory 
of controls as a function of time. It is well known that when the objective function 
is quadratic and the equation of motion linear, optimal controls can be expressed as 
a linear function of state. Thus, it is not surprising that in the difference game, the 
equilibrium reaction functions are linear in the initial state:
ut =  dt -f Etxo
As in the control problems, dt and Et are independent of the state, but depend on the 
parameters of the problem. Very little attention has been given to the development 
of computational techniques to solve //-person games and especially to find open- 
loop and closed-loop equilibrium controls (Pau 1975). Hence, the chief interest here 
is to describe a new technique for solving more general problems without making too 
much simplifications on the environment. The numerical algorithm described is used 
for the approximation of open-loop Nash equilibrium controls in a difference game 
of fixed duration and initial state.
1.3 Genetic Algorithm
GAs are search algorithms based on the mechanics of natural selection and natural 
genetics. GA was developed by Holland (1975) in such a way that even in large and 
complicated search spaces, given certain conditions on the problem domain, GAs 
would tend to converge on solutions that are globally optimal or nearly so (Goldberg 
1989). A number of experimental studies have shown that GAs exhibit impressive 
efficiency in practice. While classical gradient search techniques are more efficient
10
for problems which satisfy tight constraints (e.g, continuity, low dimensionality, uni- 
modility etc.) Genetic Algorithms consistently outperform both gradient techniques 
and various forms of random search on more difficult (and more common) problems, 
such as optimization involving discountinuous, noisy, high dimensional and multi­
modal objective functions. A GA performs a multi-directional search maintaining a 
population of potential solutions. This population undergoes a simulated evolution: 
at each generation the relatively “good” solutions reproduce, while relatively “bad” 
solutions die. Hence, it is an iterative procedure which maintains a constant size 
population of candidate solutions or structures. During each iteration step, called 
generation, the structures in the current population are evaluated and on the basis 
of those evaluations, a new population of candidate solutions are formed. At first 
glance, it seems strange that such simple mechanisms should motivate anything use­
ful but GAs combine partial string to form new solutions that are possibly better 
than their predecessor. So, a general sketch of the algorithm appears as:
procedure GA 
begin 
t = 0;
initialize P(t); 
evaluate structures in P(t); 
while termination condition not satisfied do 
begin 
t = t + 1;
select P(t) from P(t-l); 
recombine structures in P(t); 
evaluate structures in P(t); 
end
end
Fig 1: A General Sketch of the Genetic Algorithm 
Structures are usually coded as strings of characters drawn from some finite alphabet 
(often the binary alphabet; 0,1). For example, if we represent structures or solutions 
with finite lenght of / =  3, then we have eight possible choice of binary strings with 
the following interpretations:
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string Interpretation
000 0 x 2 0 + 0 x 2 ^ 0 x 2 ^  =  0
001 1 x 2 0 + 0 x 2 ^ 0 x 2 ^  =  1
010 0 x 2 0 + 1 x 2 ^ 0 x 2 ^  =  2
o n 1 x 2 0 + 1 x 2 ^ + 0 x 2 2  =  3
100 0 x 2 0 + 0 x 2 ^ + 1 x 2 2  =  4
101 1 x 2 0 + 0 x 2 ^ + 1 x 2 2  =  5
n o 0 x 2 ° + 1 x 2 H 1 x 22 =  6
111 1 x 2 0 + 1 x 2 ^ 1 x 2 2  =  7
GAs use vocabulary borrowed from natural genetics, thus the structures or decision 
rules in a population are called chromosomes or strings. In our game context, a set of 
strings would be interpreted as a set of strategies or optimal plans. The performance 
of the strategies or the decision rules in a given environment is evaluated through 
their fitness functions. In economic modeling, the fitness function measures the value 
of profit or utility resulting from the behavior prescribed by a given rule or rules. 
The rules are updated using a set of genetic operators which include reproduction, 
crossover, mutation, and election.
Reproduction makes copies of individual chromosomes. The criterion used in 
copying is the value of the fitness function. This operator is an artificial version 
of natural selection, a survival of the fittest by Spencer among string creatures. 
In natural population, fitness is determined by a creature’s ability for survival and 
subsequent reproduction.
The primary genetic operator for GA is the crossover operator. The crossover 
operator is executed in three steps: (1) a pair of strings is chosen from the set 
of copies; (2) the strings are placed side by side and a point is randomly chosen 
somewhere along the length of the strings; (3) the segments to the left of the point 
are exchanged between the strings. For example, a crossover of 111000 and 010101 
after the second position produces the offsprings OllOOO and 110101. Crossover, 
working with reproduction according to performance, turns out to be a powerful 
way of biasing the system towards certain patterns.
Mutation is a secondary search operator which increases the variability of the 
population. After selection of one individual, each bit position (allele in the chromo­
some) in the new population undergoes a random change with a probability equal to
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the mutation rate. For example, after mutation individual 111000 becomes 101000 
since the second bit position undergoes a change. A high level of mutation yields an 
essentially random search.
Election tests the newly generated offsprings before they are permitted to become 
members of a new population. The potential fitness of an offspring is compared to 
the actual fitness values of its parents. Parents are the pairs of strings that are taken 
from mating pool for the crossover application. A pair is randomly matched and 
mated; thus the parents and children or offsprings form the new population after 
election.
The algorithm starts by selecting a random sample of M  strings (M  decision 
rules), and then applying four operators sequentially. After a new population is 
created via mating operator, the algorithm applies the same four operators again, 
continuing either for a prespecified number of rounds or until a stable population of 
string values or decision rules emerges. As the “solution” of the original, select the 
fittest member from the final population.
The reproduction operator increases the representation of relatively fit individuals 
in the population, but does nothing to find a fitter individual. The mutation and 
mating operator (crossover operator) can add new elements to the population, while 
destroying old ones. If mutation is applied too frequently (mutation probability is 
too high), it slows or prevents convergence and degrades the performance of the 
algorithm because it destroys the fit individuals along with the unfit. The mating 
operator seems to be a very good device for probabilistically injecting diversity, while 
giving structures that have proved their fitness a shot at surviving.
This algorithm has proved its value in a variety of applications (Sargent 1993). It 
has some features of a parallel algorithm, both in obvious sense that it simultaneously 
processes a sample distribution of elements, and in the subtler sense that instead 
of processing individuals, it is really processing equivalence classes of individuals. 
These equivalence classes, which Holland calls schemata, are defined by the lengths 
of common segments of bit strings. The algorithm is evidently a random search 
cilgorithrn, one that does not confine its searches locally.^
■^ For application of GA to economic problems, see Marimon et al. 1990, Marks 1992, Arifovic 1994a,1994b
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1.4 Algorithm For Searching Open-Loop Noncooperative 
Solutions
GAs aim at complex problems. They belong to the class of probabilistic algorithms, 
yet they are different from random algorithms as they combine elements of stochastic 
search. The advantage of such genetic-based search methods is that they maintain a 
population of potential solutions whereas all other methods process a single point of 
search space. Thus a GA performs a multi-directional search by maintaining a pop­
ulation of potential solutions and encouraging information formation and exchanges 
between these directions. In the game theoretic framework, we use both the opti­
mization and the learning property of the GA. At each generation or step, players 
play the whole game and the scores are rated.
For presentational simplicity, we will restrict attention to two-player games here, 
but the algorithm can be generalized to N  players, each with a different objective 
function. Thus, in this environment, there are two artificially intelligent pla5'^ ers who 
update their strategies through GA and a fictive player who has full knowledge of 
both players’ actions. The term “fictive player” , or “referee” , is not essential but we 
need an intermediary for the exchange of best responses of each player to the action 
of other player in each generation and this intermediary is called fictive player in 
the study^. This player has no decisive role but provides the best strategies in each 
iteration to the requested parties synchronously.
In this environment, we have two separate GAs. Each GA is used to play one 
side of the problem and each side has its own evaluation function (utility function, 
profit function or cost function) and population. The evaluation functions of each 
player have different parameters and functional form depending on the problem of 
that player. The crucial part in this algorithm is that the problems of each player are 
solved synchronously. Since we have two different players with different objectives, 
the problem complexity of each phiyer varies. Thus, based on the complexity of the 
fitness function, one-player might evaluate the performance of his or her strategies 
faster than the other player. However, in order to learn the action of the other player 
against his or her strategies, each player waits for the other player’s action in each
Mn the UNIX system, in order to reach and distribute the information available we used shared memory and 
called this memory as a fictive player.
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generation. Thus the game must be played synchronously and genetic operators 
must be applied sequentially to each generation (see Figure 2).
Another crucial part is that the best response of each player is available immedi­
ately and each player decides his own strategies according to the best strategies of 
the other player. This is the learning process provided by GA. The information of 
the best strategies are kept in the shared memory which is controlled by the Active 
player. Each player solves his or her problem and sends the information about the 
best decision rules or solutions to the shared memory. Then each player copies the 
result of the other player’s solution and solves his problem again through GA.
Initial decision rules are generated randomly for the entire planning period and 
in order to measure the performance of these randomly generated rules, each player 
needs the actions of the other player. Hence, each player sends the very first decision 
rules generated randomly to the shared memory and the performance of the ran­
domly generated rules are evaluated. Since GA maintains constant size population 
of candidate solutions, we have initially M  solutions for each time period decision 
rule. For example, for the two-period problem, we have two decision rules to find, 
hence initially 2 times M solutions are generated for each player to start the game.
1.5 Numerical Examples
1.5.1 A Simple Example
Usually, numerical optimizations and simulations of a model constitute an experi­
ment and consequently, they should be performed and evaluated with some sort ol 
critical eye that is appropriate to a laboratory or field experiment. Hence we will 
offer technical information to the interested researchers for the application of the 
algorithm for other discrete dynamic games.
A simple numeric example is taken from Kydland (1975). Assume that the prob­
lems of two noncooperative players are
2 ,
max ^ ( 1  -  Xu -  X2t)xit -  ^ ’4
/.=1
subject to
Xit + Uit, xo given, i =  1,2
Hjpon r(;quest, I will provide the C code of the algorithm by e-mail. My e-mail address is suheylaObilkent.cdu.tr
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The maximization is over decision rules; u,i and Uj2 for i — 1,2. The analytical 
solution of open-loop decision rules for player i {i =  1,2)® are
u,i = —0.6947xio — 0.0947x20 + 0.2632
Uj'2 — —0.1789xio -|- 0.0211x20 T 0.0526
If the initial state variables were xio =  a;2o =  0.1, then the open-loop solutions for 
player 1 would be u\\ =  0.1842 and U\2 =  0.0368.
The algorithm developed in this study starts with the determination of the GA 
parameters which affect the convergence property of the algorithm. However, since 
the aim of this study is to obtain a general purpose algorithm for A^-person difference 
game, we tried to use parameters which are generalized in the most GA experiments.
1.5.1.1 The Space of Genetic Algorithm
Holland (Grefenstette 1986) describes a fairly general framework for the class of 
GAs. There are many possible elaborations of GAs involving variations such as 
other genetic operators, variable sized population etc. This study is limited to a par­
ticular subclass of GAs characterized by the following parameters; population size 
M, crossover rate pc, mutation rate pm, generation gap G, selection strategy S. Pop­
ulation size affects both performance and efficiency of G/ls, and a large population is 
more likely to contain representatives from a large number of hypei planes. Crossover 
rate controls the frequency with which the crossover operation is applied. Mutation, 
which is the secondary search operator, increases the variability of the search spaces. 
The generation gap controls the percentage of population to be repUiced during each 
generation. The selection strategy is the elitist strategy, E which stipulates that the 
structure with the best performance always survives intact into the next generation. 
In the absence of such a strategy, it is possible for the best structure to disappear 
due to sampling error, crossover and mutation.
In this study, we use parameters as GA =  GM(50,0.6,0.03,1.0, E). The parame­
ters are population size, crossover rate, mutation rate, generation gap and selection 
strategy respectively. For having an initial population which is generated randomly, 
player 1 uses random seed 123456789 and player 2 uses 987654321.
^Since the game is symmetric, solutions are same for each player.
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1.5.1.2 Computational Details
The example discussed above needed little computer power; but, as the aim in this 
chapter is to study more complex problems, we worked in the UNIX operating system. 
All the programs are written in the C programming language. There are various 
versions of UNIX in use today and AT&T Unix System V which was merged under 
Sun Microsystems SunOS (late 1989) is one of the predominant version. Here, we 
will give running time under SunOS.
Furthermore, we used publicly documented Genetic Search Implementation Sys­
tem; GENESIS (see Appendix) developed by Grefenstette for the application of 
genetic operators. Although the Sun microcomputers are used in this study, it is 
always possible to run all programs in IBM P C ’s using Turbo C.
1.5.1.3 Experiment and Results
The example given in Kydland is two-period, two-player noncooperative game. Hence, 
we have to find two optimal strategies; un and «¿2 (* =  1,2) for each player which 
maximize the fitness functions of the two players. The fitness function /, which mea­
sures the performance of each individual strategy in the population, is obtained by 
substituting constraints into the objective function:
Player 1:
1
/1 — (1 ~  1^0 ~  ·ίίιι ~  ^ '20  ~  ·ί^2ΐ)(3:ιο +  'Wii) — 2^11
1
(1 ~ 2:10 — Uii — U[2 — X20 — U21 — U22)(^10 +  W'll +  ~
Player 2:
/2 — (1 ~ 2:10 — Uii — X20 — U2l ) { ^ 2 0  +  'ί^ 2ΐ) ~
(1 “  3:10 — U i i  — U 12 — X20 — 1^ 21 ~  '^22) ( 3:20 +  U2l +  U22) ~  2^ '^22
It is worth noting that GA uses the original problem not the first-order conditions 
for decision making. As mentioned before, the game starts with the generation ot 50 
decision rules; un,Ui2 for each player (i — 1,2). For the evaluation of these decisions, 
each player needs to know the other player’s decisions for two periods. Hence, when 
the random numbers are generated as the potential decision rules of each player, 
the very first individual decision set in the population is immediately sent to the
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shared memory by each player and is used as the best decisions of that player for 
that generation:
G en
0
Individual
1
«11 «1 2 «21
0.341924 0.400504 0.285466 0.057359
«22
The fitness functions for generation 1 are calculated for the whole population by 
using these values as the best decision rules of each player. From Table 1.1, we 
can follow the generation of new individuals and their convergence to the optimal 
decisions for each player:
Table 1.1: Convergence to the Optimal Decisions
G en «11 «12 h «21 «22 /2
0 0.055772 0.094682 0.225860 0.105699 0.015076 0.242384
1 0.177234 0.044419 0.221428 0.194690 0.012314 0.221126
5 0.177234 0.044419 0.218435 0.188846 0.032502 0.221697
10 0.177127 0.043458 0.218440 0.188846 0.032502 0.222071
15 0.179187 0.044419 0.214624 0.189212 0.043656 0.220319
20 0.179187 0.044312 0.214872 0.188846 0.043580 0.220370
25 0.179080 0.040299 0.218371 0.188891 0.032761 0.221896
30 0.179080 0.040299 0.218371 0.188891 0.032761 0.221896
35 0.183627 0.041459 0.220636 0.184390 0.034211 0.218788
40 0.183627 0.039750 0.220649 0.184390 0.034211 0.219333
45 0.183627 0.039750 0.220358 0.184390 0.035111 0.219336
50 0.183627 0.039750 0.220518 0.184085 0.035187 0.219336
200 0.184115 0.037003 0.219864 0.184375 0.036698 0.219923
400 0.184207 0.036835 0.219916 0.184207 0.036851 0.219921
600 0.184207 0.036835 0.219912 0.184222 0.036835 0.219921
800 0.184207 0.036851 0.219912 0.184222 0.036835 0.219916
1000 0.184207 0.036851 0.219921 0.184207 0.036835 0.219916
1200 0.184207 0.036851 0.219916 0.184207 0.036851 0.219916
1400 0.184207 0.036851 0.219916 0.184207 0.036851 0.219916
1495 0.184207 0.036851 0.219916 0.184207 0.036851 0.219916
■At trial 50000, the open-loop decision rules for player 1 and player 2 has almost 
been reached by GA. However, we ran 25000 more trials which takes less than 2 inoie 
minutes, to decide that GA converged to the optimal rules. When compared to the 
exact solutions, it is apparent that GA works. The theory behind why GA works
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depends on the idea that an optimally intelligent system should process currently 
available information about payoff from the unknown environment so as to find the 
optimal tradeoff between cost of exploration of new points in the search space and 
the cost of exploitation of already evaluated points in the search space.
1.5.2 A Wage Bargaining Game
A typical example of policy optimization in a policy game is given by Brandsma and 
Hughes Hallett (1984) using the formulation by L.R. Klein to describe the mech­
anism of the American economy in the interwar period, 1933-1936. Theil (1964) 
reduced Klein’s highly aggregative equation system into three instruments and three 
noncontrolled (target) variables. The targets (consumption C, investment / ,  and 
income distribution D) are linked to three instruments (public sector wages 14^ 2, the 
indirect tax yield T, and government expenditures G). The decision problem of 
Roosevelt is to resolve the depression and to return economic activity per head to 
at least its previous peak (1929) level. Brandsma and Hughes Hallett partition the 
available, instruments as W2 for one player (organized labor or union) and T and G 
for second player (government or budgetary authority). The idea is to examine the 
optimal policies in a noncooperative game between the Roosevelt administration and 
organized labor as the economic strategy of the New Deal was introduced to counter 
the great recession of that period. Organized labor was one of the chief groups in 
the coalition which brought Roosevelt to power. It had suffered particularly from 
the recession and unemployment after 1929. So, labor could have been expected to 
attempt to extract a price for its continued support. Its instruments would be power 
to influence wage demands and hence income distribution as well as the industriel.! 
relations in public and private sector (Hughes Hallett and Rees, 1983). In Theil’s 
exercise, current welfare is loosely represented by consumption; future welfare by 
investment, and the distribution of income between capital and labor reflects the 
New Deal commitment to organized labor.
By the above, desired consumption in 1936 is C^q =  (^ 29(1 +  « ) '  where o; =  0.1 is 
the observed population growth rate and the subscripts denote the year (C29 57.8
in billions of dollars of 1934, is the realized level of total consumption in 1929). 
As to investment, / ,  it appears that this variable was of the order of 10 percent of
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consumption during 1920s, and hence, desired investment in 1939, averaged — 
0.1(736. Theil took D =  W\ — 2Tr as the income distribution where W\ is private 
wage bill and tt is profit, and put its desired level in 1936 equal to zero; =  
0. To specify desired values for the intermediate years; 1933-1935, simple linear 
interpolation is done between the actual values in 1932 (the last year before President 
Roosevelt administration) and the corresponding desired values in 1936. Hence, 
C U i =  C32+f(C3^6-C32), /I2+, =  h 2 +\(CU -C^·,) and =  D , 2  +  \ (D i , -D 2 2)
for i =  1, ...,4. A game naturally arises here through conflicting private interests of 
the government (or employer) and organized labor for rebuilding consumption and 
investment. Organized labor would press for faster increases in the wage bill W\ 
in order to restore their last earnings and employment levels. But employers would 
demand a restoration of profits (by 1932, D was large and positive) in order to boost 
investment and the government would have to admit in order to secure the welfare. 
That implies the employees would have ideal values for D which remain above Theil’s 
smooth restoration of status quo ante; while the employers and government would 
set values which imply a faster return to zero. This shows that administration was
fully aware of this conflict and the need to resolve it.
The desired level of instruments is also handled in an analogous manner. Following 
the trend argument, the desired values are projections of the observed trends in the 
associated variables over 1920-32. The numerical specification of these values are 
given in Table 1.2 (Brandsma and Hughes Hallett, 1984).
Table 1.2: Desired Values of Instruments and Target Variables
Policy 1933 1934 1935 1936
Labor
C 49.49 53.78 57.88 61.97
I -3.10 0.00 3.10 6.20
D 12.50 10.00 7.50 5.00
W 2 5.04 5.25 5.47 5.69
Government
C 49.49 53.78 57.88 61.97
I -3.10 0.00 3.10 6.20
D 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
T 7.40 7.64 7.87 8.11
G 10.44 10.87 11.30 11.73
The objective function was formulated as the minimization of the sum of squares
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of the deviations between actual and desired values of variables which are interests 
of each player. Thus, the private interests of each player i, can be represented by 
the quadratic loss function,
where — is the vector of target variables, is the vector
of instruments, and 5 *^) and are positive definite symmetric matrices. These 
matrices; denote penalties which imply that accelerating unit penalties
accrue to persistent or cumulating failures in electorally significant variables. The 
private objective functions were specified by picking out the relevant penalties from 
those revealed in the historical policy decisions (Ancot et al. 1982). The objective 
function is summarized in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: The Preference Structure: penalties on squared failures
Preference
Policy 1933 1934 1935 1936 Matrix
Labor
C 1.0 1 . 0 1.0 1.0 B
I 0.01 0.3 1.0 0.5 B
D 0.5 0.5 2.0 5.0 B
W2 1.0 2 .0 1.0 5.0 A
Government
C 1.0 2 .0 5.0 4.0 B
I 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.5 B
D 0.5 0.4 2.0 0.25 B
T 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 A
G 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 A
T and G 0.25 0.25 0.0 -0.4 A
C and I 0.05 0.0 1.0 0 .0 B
C and D 0.3 0.0 - 1.0 - 1.0 B
Intertemporal
Penalties:
T35 and T3 6 :-0 . 1  T35, and G 36:-0.1 G33 and T36:-0.5
G33 and G36 -.0.5 G3 5 and T 36^0.2 G35 and G36:0.3
C33 and C3 5 :0.5 C3 3 and C36:0.5 C35 and C3 6 :2 . 0
D35 and C36 : - 1.0  C33 and G 3s : 0.5
Player 1 has one instrument =  W2 while player 2 has two instruments x^ ·^ ^
7 . (J to play. Also, each decision maker has ideal values for his own decision
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variables, so that and =  a;^ *) — define his policy failures.
Thus each player’s aim is to minimize his failures subject to constraints, implied by 
the econometric model;
xf =  ^  s\i = 1 , 2
where =  1,2 are known matrices containing the dynamic multipliers =
dxjlfdx^ \it >  k and zeros otherwise and where s' is the subvector of s associated with 
y' and denotes structural disturbances. Thus i?'·' describes the response of player Vs 
targets to his own instruments and their responses to player j ’s decisions. Since 
each player has the same noncontrollable variables, the constraint equation can be 
written in aggregate form:
y — Rx +  s
or more exclusively, as
2/1
2/2
2/3
. . -
! x '  =
Ri
R.2
Rs
R,
Rx
R2
R3
Ri
R2 Ri
Xi 5l
+ 52
3^ 53
, is the vector of instrument variables and the coefficient matri­
ces Ri measure the effectiveness of instruments with respect to current uncontrolled 
variables, hence they are equal to submatrices R['} , R2 2 , R3 3 , R44 ■ In the same way, 
the matrix R 2 measures the effectiveness of the instruments with respect to uncon­
trolled variables one year later, hence it is equal to submatrices And
so on. Thus, the submatrices of the multiplicative and the additive structure of the 
constraint can be summarized as in Table 1.4 (Theil, 1964).
Evidently, each player’s optimal strategy depends on and must be determined 
simultaneously with the optimal decisions to be expected from the other player. In 
the absence of cooperation, the optimal decisions will satisfy
for i =  1 , 2 ; i ^  j  for all feasible ^
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Table 1.4: The Multiplicative and Additive Structure of the Constraints
W2 T G
H i «1
c 0.666 -0.188 0.671 37.55
I -0.052 -0.296 0.259 -5.62
D 0.285 2.358 1.427 5.04
H2 «2
c -0.234 -1.014 1.170 35.18
I -0.152 -0.894 0.759 -4.64
D 0.095 1.172 -0.475 0.08
H s 5.3
C -0.172 -1.006 0.859 36.55
I -0.076 -0.518 0.382 -2.49
D -0.007 0.186 0.033 -3.61
«4
C -0.079 -0.543 0.396 42.84
I -0.005 -0.088 0.024 2.11
D -0.060 -0.285 0.301 -11.91
1.5.2.1 Optimal Strategies
The numerical result of this wage-setting game by GA is summarized in Table 1.5. 
Table 1.5: Open-Loop Nash Strategies in 1934 billions dollar
Policy 1933 1934 1935 1936
Instruments:
W2 5.621 6.591 11.505 7.621
T 5.139 6.099 4.805 8.122
G 11.690 10.929 10.001 11.365
Target Strategies: 
C 48.172 52.908 58.985 61.666
I -4.406 -0.533 1.297 4.115
D 2.077 1.748 0.612 -1.665
= 237.187 
tuG) = 10.765
Before examining the result, the technical points can be summarized as follows; 
population size is 50, crossover rate is 0.6, mutation rate is 0.03 and finally, number 
of trials is 2 millions. The optimal strategies are tested whether or not they satisfy 
necessary conditions, first and second order conditions. Since GA does not use first-
24
order conditions for decision making, we have to test whether the results of GA 
satisfy these conditions derived in the original paper. Then the necessary conditions 
for an optimal strategy to hold is the following:
dw^^ldx^^ +  {dx/^ldx^^ydw^^ldy^^ =  0
for all the estimated decision rules x ’^ ’^s. We found that the first-order conditions 
hold with 0.003 error. Since this is a numeric study, the results are all near optimal 
and quite convincing.
The results show rather stable values for the government expenditure on goods and 
services. The values are consistently above their desired level which is, of course, in 
accordance with generally accepted ideas about anti-depression policies. Regarding 
the uncontrollable variables; C and I, we observe that strategy values are below the 
desired levels, which is also in accordance with a depression situation.
1.6 W hy Does GA Work?
One method of obtaining the open-loop Nash equilibrium solutions of the class of 
discrete time games is to view them as static infinite games, and directly apply the 
methodology that minimizes cost functional over control sets and then determines the 
intersection points of the resulting reaction curves. Such an approach can sometimes 
lead to quite unwieldy expressions, especially if the number of stages in the game 
is large (Başar and Oldser 1982). An alternative derivation which partly removes 
this difficulty is the one that utilizes techniques of optimal control theory, by making 
explicit use of the stage additive nature of the cost functionals and the specific 
structure of the extensive-form description of the game (For a more general treatment 
see Başar and Oldser (chapter 6) 1982). There is, in fact, a close relationship between 
the derivation of open-loop Nash equilibria and the problem of solving (jointly) 
N  optimal control problems since each A^-tuple of strategies constituting a Nash 
equilibrium solution describes an optimal control problem whose structure is not 
affected by the remaining players’ control vectors. This structure of dynamic or 
differential games enables GA to work in deriving optimal open-loop strategies.
Amenability to parallelization is an appealing feature of the conventional genetic 
algorithm. In genetic methods, the genetic operations themselves are very simple
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and not very time consuming; whereas the measurement of fitness of the individu­
als in the population is typically complicated and time consuming. In considering 
a.pproaches for parallelizing genetic methods, it is important to note that for all but 
the most trivial problems, the majority of the computational effort is consumed by 
the calculation of fitness. The execution of the genetic operation can be parallelized 
in the manner described by Robertson (1987); however, we focus here on wa,ys of 
parallelizing genetic programming that distribute the computational effort needed 
to compute fitness. There are some basic approaches to parallelization. In one of 
the approaches called distributed genetic approach, the population for a given run is 
divided into subpopulations (Koza 1993). Each subpopulation is assigned to a pro­
cessor, and the genetic algorithm operates on each subpopulation separately. Upon 
completion of a certain designated number of generations, a certain percentage of 
the individuals in each population are selected for emigration, and there is a partial 
exchange of members between the subpopulations.
The algorithm developed in this chpater follows a similar idea while exchanging 
the best results in each generation. We used the property of problem independence 
of GA and solved open-loop strategies as an N joint optimal control problem. The 
main goal in this study is to show the success of the algorithm, developed here in 
solving nonlinear djmamic games with some empirical evidence. Başar and Oldser 
proved that an A^-person linear quadratic dynamic game with appropriate dimen­
sional matrices, has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution. For problems 
that violate the appropriate dimensionals, we apply numerical methods. GA offered 
here is an efficient technique to obtain open-loop Nash-equilibrium solutions of the 
finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic games.
Future research might profitably examine the closed-loop noncooperative solu­
tions. For closed-loop solution procedure, we need to work on the objective function 
of each player separately to make selection. So, in this case, the most important 
part will be to devise a more efficient selection procedure. In our open-loop proce­
dure, we were selecting new population of each player at the same time but in the 
closed-loop, we might offer intersection or union of the selections done separately to 
form new population and apply other genetic operators. Each individual’s gene will 
be the one attached to another (concatenation) of the genes from what we have in 
the two population shared memory algorithm. So, to use GA to solve closed-loop
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we have to write a new selection procedure such as: Initiall,y using the first players 
objective function, we make selection and form set of solutions of that player and 
then doing the same procedure, we form the other player’s set of solutions. By either 
intersection or union of these sets, we form a new set of solutions but of course, both 
have some difficulties such as having an empty set in the intersection. However, the 
critical in the solution procedure for the closed-loop games in GA will be selecting 
the new population set. We have to further study whether intersection or union will 
be the suitable selection procedure.
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Appendix
A .l  Setup Program of GENESIS
The GENEtic Search Implementation System describes a system for function opti­
mization based on genetic search techniques. The aim of this program is to promote 
the study of genetic algorithms for function minimization only. Only genetic opera­
tors as a procedure for various purposes are done automatically. Then the researchers 
design their program using C language.
Before running the GA, execute the “setup” program, which prompts you for a 
number of input parameters for genetic operators. All of this information is stored in 
files for future use, so you may only need to run “setup” once. A <return> response 
to any prompt gets the default value shown in brackets. The prompts are as follows:
- the suffix for file names :
If a string is entered, say “foo” , then the files for this run will have names like 
“in.foo” , “out.foo” , “log.foo” , etc. Otherwise, the file names are “in” , “out” , “log ', 
etc.
-  Floating point representation [y]:
Unless this is declined, the user will be asked the specify the
-  number of genes:
Each gene will take on a range of floating point values, with a user-defined granularity  ^
and output format. The user will be asked to specify for each gene: its minimum 
value; its maximum value; the number of values (must be a positive power of 2); the 
desired output format for this gene (using printf format, e.g., also specify a repetition 
count, meaning that there a number of genes with the same range, granularity, and 
output format. When all genes have been specified, the information is stored in the 
“template” file, and Setup prompts for:
-  the number of experiments [1]:
This is the number of independent optimizations of the same function.
-  the number of trials per experiment [1000]:
-  the population size [50]:
-  the length of the structures in bits [30]:
If the “f ” (floating point representation) option is selected, this number will computed 
automatically from the information collected above.
-  the crossover rate [0.60]:
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• I,he mutation rate [0.001];
- the generation ga.p [l.Oj:
The generation gap indicates the fraction of the population which is replaced in each 
generation.
-  the scaling window [5]:
When minimizing a numerical function with a GA, it is common to define the perfor­
mance value u(x) of a structure x as u(x) =  fmax - f(x), where fmax is the maximum 
value that f(x) can assume in the given search space. This transformation guarantees 
that the performance u(x) is positive, regardless of the characteristics of f(x). Often, 
fmax is not available a priori, in which case we maj  ^ define u(x) =  f(xmax) - f(x), 
where f(xmax) is the maximum value of any structure evaluated so far. Either defini­
tion of u(x) has the unfortunate effect of making good values of x hard to distinguish. 
For example, suppose fmax =  100. After several generations, the current population 
might contain only structures x for which 5 < f(x) < 10. At this point, no structure 
in the population has a performance which deviates much from the average. This 
reduces the selection pressure toward the better structures, and the search stagnates. 
One solution is to define a new parameter Fmax with a value of, say, 15, and rate 
each structure against this standard. For example, if f(xi) =  5 and f(xj) =  10. then 
u(xi) =  Fmax - f(xi) =  10, and u(xj) =  Fmax - f(xj) =  5; the performance of xi now 
appears to be twice as good as the performance of xj. The scaling window W allows 
the user to control how often the baseline performance is updated. If W > 0 then 
the system sets Fmax to the greatest value of f(x) which has occurred in the last W 
generations. A value of W =  0 indicates an infinite window (i.e. u(x) =  f(xmax) - 
f(x)).
-  the number of trials between data collections [100]:
-  how many of the best structures should be saved [10]:
-  how many consecutive generations are permitted without any evaluations oc­
curring [2]:
-  the number of generations between dumps [0]:
0 indicates no dumps will occur.
-  the number of dumps that should be saved [0]:
- the options (see below) [cefgl]:
The option “c” collects statistics concerning the convergence of the algorithm, “e”
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uses the ’’elitist” selection strategy, “ f” uses the floating point representation, “g” 
uses Gray code. A Gray code is sometimes useful in representing integers in GAs, 
“1” log activity (starts and restarts) in the “log” file. Some error messages also 
end up in the “log” file, integers in genetic algorithms. Other used options in this 
experiment are “M” maximizes the evciluation function. The default is to minimize 
the evaluation function and “a” evaluates all structures in each generation.
-  the seed for the random number generator [123456789]:
-  RankMin [0.75]:
This is the minimum expected number of offspring for ranking (used only if option 
“R” is set). The Ranking selection algorithm used here is a linear mapping under 
which the worst structure is assigned RankMin offspring and the best is assigned (2 
- RankMin).
Setup then echoes the input file, and exits. The setup program should be run at least 
once for each new evaluation function, but after that, it may be more convenient to 
simply edit the input file to make minor changes to the parameters.
30
Appendix
A .l .  C codes of. the main program for the game introduced by Kydland 
Player I:*"
#include "extern.h"
#include "sem op .h "
#define SH M K E Y _P  ((key_t) 9894)
#define S H M K E Y _S  ((key_t) 9895)
#define S E M K E Y l ((key_t) 8393)
#define SEM K E Y2 ((key_t) 8394)
#define SEM K EY3 ((key_t) 8395)
#define N O R T H  1
# d e fin e T M A X  2 
#define YIO 0.1 
#define Y20 0.1
typedef double M esg[T M A X ];
int shm id;
int sl'UTisem,syncseml,syi'icsem2; 
M esg  ’*·χ2;
M esg  ’^ xl;
getsharedO
{
if((slim id=slTm get(SHM KEY_P,sizeof(M esg),06661 IPC _C R EA T))<0)
{
printf("server can't get shared memory*'); 
exit(l);
)
if((x2=(M esg *) slimat(slimid,(char’* )^0,0)) = =  (M esg  *) -1)
{
printf("server can't attach shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
}
if((slim id=slim get(SH M K EY_S,sizeof(M esg),06661 IPC _C R EA T))<0)
{
printf("server can't get shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
}
if((x l= (M e sg  *) slimat(shmid,(char’^ )0,0)) = =  (M esg  *) -1)
® Since the original problem  is sym m etric, we do not need to p ut the program  for P layer 2
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printf("server can't attach shared m em ory”); 
exit(l);
relsharedO
{
if(shm dt(x2)<0)
{
printf("server can't detach shared m em ory”); 
exit(l);
}
if(slim d t(xl)<0)
{
printf(”server can't detach shared m em ory”); 
exit(l);
}
sem _s ignal(syncsem  1); 
sem_signal(syi'icsem 2); 
sem _close(sy n csem l); 
sem _close(syncsem 2); 
sem _close(slim sem );
initsharedO
{
#if N O R T H
if ( (syncsem l =  sem _create(SEM K E Yl, 0)) <  0) 
err__sys(”north: can't create sync sem aphore");
if ( (syncsem 2 =  sem _create(SEM KEY3, 0)) <  0) 
err_sys("north: can't create sync  sem aphore");
if ( (sl-ansem =  sem _create(S E M K E Y 2,1)) <  0)
err_sys("north: can't create slim  sem aphore");
#else
if ( (syn csem l =  sem _open (S E M K E Y l)) <  0)
err_sys("south: can't create sync sem aphore");
if ( (syncsem 2 =  sem _open(SEM K EY3)) <  0)
err_sys("south: can't create sy n c  sem aphore");
if ( (slim sem  =  sem _open(SEM K EY2)) <  0)
err_sys("south: can't create slim  sem aphore");
#endif
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sem _w ait(shm sem );
U npack(N ew [0].G ene, Bitstring, Length); 
if (Floatflag)
{
FloatRep(Bitstring, Vector, Genes);
#if N O R T H
m em cpy(xl,Vector,sizeof(double)'*‘T M A X );
#else
m em cpy(x2,Vector,sizeof(double)’*^TMAX);
#endif
)
sem_sigi'ial(sl'ansem);
synchronize();
synchronizeO
{‘
#if N O R T H
sem _sigiial(s3m csem l); 
sem _w a i t (syncsem 2);
#else
sem _w ait(syi'icsem l);
sem _signal(syncsem 2);
#endif
m ovebesttoshared()
{
sem_wait(sl'QTisem);
U npack(N ew [Best_guy].G ene, Bitstring, Length); 
if (Floatflag)
{
FloatRep(Bitstring, Vector, Genes);
#if N O R T H
m em cpy(xl,V ector,sizeof(double)’*^TMAX);
#else
m em cpy(x2,Vector,sizeof(double)’^ TM AX);
#endif
}
sem _signal(slim sem );
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double eval(str, length, vect, genes) 
char str[]; string representation
int length; length o f bit string
double vect[]; floating point representation
int genes; num ber o f elements in vect
V
V
V
V
register int t; 
double ans=0; 
double y l[T M A X ]; 
double y2[T M A X ];
sem _w ait(shm sem );
for (t =  0; t< T M A X ; t++)
{
if(t= = 0 )
else
yl[t]=Y 10+vect[t];
y2[t]=Y 20+C x2)[t];
y  1 [t]= y l [t-l]+vect[t]; 
y2[t]=y2[t-l]+(*x2)[t]; 
)
ans+=(l-y l[t]-y2[t])*yl[t]-0 .5V ect[t]*vect[t];
}
sem_signal(slTmsem);
retum (ans);
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Three-Country Trade Relations:
A Discrete Dynamic Game Approach
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, countries have grouped for international economic cooperation with 
less than full success. Relapses into conflicting policies have been frequent. Progress 
appears to be better achieved in certain regions (the North) than in others such as 
poor regions (the South). This may be due to closer and more frequent contacts that, 
at the international level, are institutionally possible among advanced nations. In the 
Southern countries cooperation is limited by two factors- institutional déficiences and 
trade barriers. As in the North, as well as a dismantling of trade barriers, the South 
needs institutions to facilitate cooperative trade. Specialization and trade within an 
industry across national frontiers is difficult to organize without institutions which 
operate easily across nations. A number of common markets and regional trading 
agreements have tried to provide the required trading infrastructure and to reduce 
trade restriction within the South.
In an interdependent world, rational policymakers in one country may be expected 
to condition their actions on policies pursued in other countries; policymaking has 
unavoidable game aspects. In the absence of direct cooperation, it is well known that 
the outcome of such games are socially inefficient. In this chapter, we describe a game 
that may be played by agents in three countries. The analysis has three objectives. 
The first is to investigate the nature of optimal noncooperative strategies played 
between more than two players. The second is to explore the impact of cooperative 
actions and outcomes between some of the players within the three-country world. 
The third is to introduce a new solution procedure for numerical optimization of the 
discrete dynamic games using Genetic Algorithm
The three-country, two-commodity model is developed to illustrate the dynamics 
among the North and the South. This study presents a simple model of international
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trade and growth between the industrial region and the non-industrial primary ex­
porting region. There are two Southern economies that perceive tliernselves as being- 
in competition with each other for profitable international trade. The model is de­
scribed as a dynamic game between three countries in which the North determines 
the rate of investment each period, whereas countries in the South determine their 
terms of trade. The goal is to compare the noncooperative solution in which each 
country optimizes while taking as given the strategies abroad, with the coopera­
tive (coalition) equilibria in the South in which binding commitments can be made 
between the Southern countries.
In two-person games, players had to share the control of their own fate with a 
partner but they had control over their partner’s fate, which they could use as a 
threat. In n-person (three-person) games, even this threat is generally denied by the 
players, they must form coalitions with others and consider what inducements they 
must offer and accept. Hence, we consider a world economy in which two resource 
producing nations (the South) and one resourceless nation (the North) are involved. 
For the economic situation containing only one country in the North, we regard the 
North as player 1 and resource extracter countries as player 2 and player 3. Thus, the 
situation enables us to model both a noncooperative and a cooperative three-person 
game where two players in the South make a coalition.
Dynamic games based on dynamic models almost inevitabl}^ lead to solutions 
which are analytically intractable (Levine and Brociner 1994). It is true that with 
considerable ingenuity, simplifying assumptions can be made which enable tractable 
solutions to emerge. But solutions for the dynamic game equilibria concepts set out 
in this chapter require numerical solutions given particular sets of parameter values. 
The optimal control problems are quite difficult to deal with numerically. The task of 
designing and implementing algorithms for the solution of optimal control problems 
is the difficult part. However, genetic algorithms {GA) require little knowledge of 
the problem itself, and therefore, computations based on these algorithms are very 
attractive to dynamic optimization problems, particularly the discrete dynamic game 
used in this study.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the two-bloc, two 
good model. Section 2.3 describes the solution procedure and methodology for nu­
merical analysis in the three person game framework. The optimum solutions for
36
various cases in noncooperative and cooperative strategies are analyzed in Section 
2.4. Section 2.5 provides conclusions and suggestions for future research.
2.2 The Model
Three country model to be discussed is as follows. The analysis is conducted within 
a similar dynamic North-South model of Galor (1986) where this time there are two 
Southern countries and the model is discrete. The Southern countries produce an 
essential raw material using a single factor (labor) and sell the raw material to the 
North. The production functions for raw material R in the two countries are
Ru =  biLit and R■2t boL2-02i
where La is the amount of labor used in the production of raw material Ra in 
the country i of the South. We adapt the assumption that small countries, like the 
Southern countries, with small markets would specialize in constant returns products 
(Dreze, 1960). On the other hand, the North produces a single composite commodity 
which can be used either for consumption or for investment. The production function 
for good Yt is governed by fixed proportions production function
Yf =  min[aKf,nNi,rRt]
where Kt-,Nt and Rt are the amount of capital, labor and raw material used respec­
tively in the output production at time t. This production function is used merely 
for simplicity of exposition in the three-country world. There is nothing intrinsic 
about it. One could utilize Cobb-Douglas or CES production functions equally well 
and obtain similar results, though at the cost of considerably more time and algebra.
The North’s labor force is fixed over time at given level N] however, unlimited 
guest workers are available in the three-country world at a given real wage w, causing 
the supply of labor faced by the North to be perfectly elastic at this wage (Lewis, 
1954). The raw material cannot be produced at the North, but bought from any of 
the countries in the South that offers the minimum fixed price per unit, pu in terms 
of consumption good (z =  1,2). Assuming no foreign investment in the North, the 
production function depends on the proportion of capital available
Yt = aKt
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where Kt is determined by the given initial capital stock of the North; K q-
By the specification of the production function in the North, we can derive the 
labor and raw material requirements of the North as follows
Nt =  aKt/n and Rt = aKt/r
Full employment of the North’s labor force is assumed at the initial time i.e. K q > 
nN fa.
The North invests a proportion st of the return to its capital at time t while the 
rest is devoted to consumption. Its entire wage income is consumed, assuming w 
is the subsistence level in the North. Hence, the problem faced by the North is to 
choose rate of investment St to maximize the discounted value of its consumption 
stream over a given time horizon T^ \
North:
max (1)
i=0
subject to
Kt+i =  [ Y t - w ( N t - N ) - m i n { p i t , p 2t)Rt]st +  { l - S ) K t
Ko given
0 < st <  1
where p is the subjective discount factor. The North’s consumption at time t is
=  [Yt -  w{Nt -  N ) -  min{pu,p2t)Rt]{l ~  St)
and the capital stock evolves according to
Kt+i = [Yt -  w{Nt -  N ) -  min(piuP2t)Rt]st + (1 -  S)I<t
where 0 <  (5 < 1 is the depreciation rate and the portion St of Northern income so 
that earned will be saved and invested. Also, the selection criterion for the price of
^The term inal condition in this stud y is rather arbitrary. The gam e is played for certain periods chosen initially. 
We assum e th at there will be no gam e after T  periods, however, in general term inal conditions are chosen where the 
stable equilibria of the econom y are satisfied. Since the term inal conditions are not im portant part of the aim  of this 
study, we disregard the analysis of the term inal conditions.
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raw material pn offered by the country i in the South, being minimum, is added in 
both of the consumption and investment equations of the North.
Finally, in order to derive the optimal rate of investment stream and estimate the 
model, the constant risk aversion (CARA) utility function is adapted:
(C,
u{ c n I — a
where the degree of risk aversion cj > 0 and a ^  1  ^ .
On the other hand, the problem of the country i (i =  1,2) in the South is to 
choose the terms of trade pn that maximizes the discounted value of its consumption 
stream.
Southern production is used for consumption only
C f '  =  p i i R i t  ?; = i , 2
From the production function of the North, the price of raw material has no direct 
effect on the output produced in the North but through the accumulation of capital, 
the price affects the current investment and consumption in the North.
The South is characterized by the existence of surplus labor. The supplj' of labor 
is perfectly elastic at a fixed real wage w in terms of the consumption good. The 
South trades the raw material for the consumption good produced in the North. 
The terms of trade determined by the South at any point in time are assumed to be 
greater than the price which enables the South to consume at least at the subsistence 
level and smaller than the price which enables the North to consume strictly more 
than its subsistence level.
In this world economy, the demand for the raw material by the North is deter­
mined according to the production technology in the North. The primary product is 
demanded for investment and consumption purposes in the North and the division 
of any amount demanded from each of the zth country in the South depends on the 
price offered by the South {i =  1,2).
It is assumed that in addition to the production cost in the South, there is also the 
cost of carrying, holding or destroying for the amount unsold (cost of overage). Thus,
®The constant elasticity of substitution u tility  h£ts the economic property that elгısticity o f substitution betw een 
consum ptions in any two points in tim e is constant and equals to 1/a . This instantenous utility  function is frequently 
used in intertem poral optim izing m odel and has no relevant effect on the conclusion of the study.
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in tiie three-country world where Southern countries are same type, the amount oi 
primary product demand from ¿th country in the South is randomly determined by 
the North when both of the countries oifer the same minimum price ( p u  =  P21) ·  
Hence, under risk, the terms of trade decisions of the South will cover the cost of 
overage denoted b j 'd.
Thus, the problems of the Southern countries are as follows:
South 1:
r
max p^u{Cf )^
i=0
su :t to
A"t+i = [ Y t - w { N t - N ) - r n i n { p n , p 2 )Rt]si +  { l - S ) K t
c f '  =  PuRit -  Jit
R t  if P u  = m i n { p i i , p 2 t ) , P i t  ^  ? 2 t
a t R i  if P u  = r n i n { p u , P 2 t ) , P u  =  P2 t
0 if pii /  mm(pii,p2i)
0 it Ru — R-t
d {R t - R u )  iiR u¥^Rt  
Ko given
Ru —
Ju =
South 2;
(2)
T
max p^u(Cf^)
i=0
subject to
Kt+i =  [ Y t - w { N t - N ) - m i n { p u , P 2 )Rt]st +  { l - ^ ) K t  
=  P2tR2t -  J2t
Rt  if  P2t =  m m ( p u ,P 2 i ) ,P l i  ^  P2i
(1 -  a t ) R t  if  P2 t =  r n in {p u ,P 2 t ) ,P u  =  P2 t 
0 if  P2i J7 im (p i< ,p 2 i)
R2t — i
(3 )
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J'li =
0 if R2t =  Rt
d{Ri — /?2i) if R'2t 7^  R t 
K q given
where a,, is a random variable which determines the amount of raw material bought 
by the North from the country i of the South. We can consider at as demand 
shock. It is assumed that there is no transaction cost in the world, so, the North 
is indifferent to buying raw material from any of the South countries if both offer 
the same minimum price; hence, according to the number generated between and 
including zero and one, the amount sold by each South country will be determined. 
Even when, any one of the Southern countries offers the minimum price, there is 
always the possibility of selling no raw material to the North. The world is uncertain 
for the South.
Since it is assumed that the consumption good and the raw material are not 
storable goods, in the cases of similar price offers, each Southern country will suffer 
positive amount of cost of getting rid of the excess production if Oit <  1. Then 
the South trades the raw material for the consumption good produced in the North 
accordingly
if at =  0 
if 0 < at < 1 
if oct =  1
C f' =
-dRt
(pitat -  d{l -  a.t))Ri 
PuRt
c f ·  =
P2tRt
{P2t{l -  oct) -  dat)Rt 
PitRt
if at =  0 
if 0 < at < 1 
if at =  1
Under certainty, the terms of trade determined by the South, pa at any point in 
time, would be greater than the subsistence level w/bi {i =  1,2); however, in the 
three-country world with constant demand of raw material by the North, the South 
should consider the cost of unsold units of their production. Because of the existence 
of the risk of not selling all of the raw material produced in the country f, each 
Southern country takes destroying cost (cost of overage) of excess production into 
the derivation of its minimum price offer.
Since the amount of raw material demanded from the ¿th country is determined 
randomly (0 < aj <  1) by the North, Southern countries will calculate expected
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value of this random variable and determine their minimum offers
.. ^ d(l -  Q'") li,
Pit > - — —^ - +
P2t >
da^
+
w
(1 — a-'-')
where ct*' is the expected value of the random variable a. The expected value of the 
random variable at with uniform distribution over [0 1] is 0.5, thus, the minimum 
price offered by the country i in the South is
. 2 w
Pit > -,---- l· d. z =  1,2
Oi
In order to obtain concrete results, we adapt the assumption that Southern coun­
tries also have identical and homothetic tastes as in the North:
u
rriSi\i-a
 ^  ^ I -  a i =  1.2
where a > 0 and a ^  1 .
2.3 Dynamic Equilibria
The equilibria will be determined by the simultaneous solution of the three countries’ 
problem. The solution of the North’s maximization problem determines the optimal 
time path of st given the South’s prices pn and p2t, whereas the solution of the 
country i of the South’s maximization problem determines the optimal path of pu 
given the paths of St and pjt, j ^ i. The dynamic equilibria is given by the triplet 
solution [s*,p\ ,^pl^].
2.3.1 Solution Procedure
In this three-country game, players move or act simultaneously within each stage 
or period of the game and know the actions that were chosen in all past strategies. 
This three-country game is a dynamic game that concerns itself with determining 
how policymakers, or agents, within each economy, acting over time, choose optimally 
among some given set of actions. A crucial point is that even within a deterministic 
context, the choice of plan and the nature of the underlying information pattern
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is critical to the equilibrium outcome of the game. This is in contrast to a single 
country dynamic optimization context where, under the assumptions of uncertainty, 
such a choice is unimportant.
In a dynamic game, a precise delineation of the information pattern, such as which 
agent knows what, how the information pattern available to each agent evolves over 
time, how much of this is common information shared by all players and what part 
of it constitutes private information for each player, is of paramount importance. An 
information set is open-loop if only the priori raw data set is available at all points 
in time and in this case the policy variables that depend only upon time are called 
open-loop policies.
The players are assumed to never observe any history other than their moves and 
time; at the beginning of the game they must choose time paths of actions that 
depend only on calendar time, hence the dynamic equlibrium in open-loop strategies 
found in this experiment is an open-loop equilibrium.
If the players can condition their strategies on other variables in addition to calen­
dar time, they may prefer not to use open-loop strategies in order to react to mixed 
strategies and the possible deviations by their rivals from the equilibrium strategies. 
Such strategies are called closed-loop strategies which is valid when the player’s can 
observe and respond to their opponent’s action at the end of each period. However, in 
this study, open-loop strategies are preferred; firstly, they are analytically tractable 
in the three country game because the closed-loop strategy space is so much larger, 
secondly, it is assumed that the players in the South are small in the sense that 
unexpected deviations by the opponent would have little influence on the player’s 
optimal play.
The solutions of dynamic games with multiperiod even for twoplayer games, are 
hard to handle analytically, a three-player game would immediately increase the 
strategy space to search. We have to first set the rule of the game and adapt the 
shared memory algorithm developed by Ozyildirim (1997) for the numerical solution 
of dynamic games.
Finally, in this three country world, there are two countries which are allowed to 
be identical or different in production technology which enables us to analyze varies 
experiments over dynamic North-South game.
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2.3.2 Shared Memory Algorithm For 3-Players
Many techniques are used today for optimizing control systems. Most of these 
techniques can be broadly classified under two main classes: calculus-based tech­
niques, and, enurnerative schemes. The calculus-based techniques, although exten­
sively used, have the following drawbcicks: they are local in slope, i.e., the extrema 
they seek are the ones closer to the current point, and they depend on the exis­
tence of either derivatives or some function evaluation scheme. Thus, calculus-based 
methods lack robustness over the broad spectrum of optimization functions. Man}  ^
enurnerative schemes have been proposed to overcome the shortcomings of calculus- 
based methods. These schemes lack efficiency because many practical search spaces 
are too large to search. Another type of algorithm that has gained popularity is the 
random search technique. This algorithm lacks efficiency and in the long run, can 
be expected to do no better than enumerative schemes.
One technique that is global and robust over a broad spectrum of problems is 
the genetic algorithm (GA). Genetic algorithms are search procedures based on the 
mechanics of natural genetics. Genetic algorithms were originally developed by Hol­
land in 1975. The approach is very different from classical search methods, where 
movement is from one point in the search space to another point based on some tran­
sition rule. Another important difference between GAs and the classical approaches 
is in the selection of the transition rule. In classical methods of optimization, the 
transition rule is deterministic. In contrast, GAs use probabilistic operators to guide 
their search (Goldberg 1989).
A simple genetic algorithm is composed of three operators:
1. reproduction
2. crossover
3. mutation
Reproduction is a process where old strings is carried through into a new population 
depending on the performance index (i.e. fitness or utility) values. Due to this move, 
strings with better fitness values get large number of copies in the next generation. 
Selecting good strings for the reproduction operation can be implemented in man}  ^
different ways. A simple crossover follows reproduction in three steps. First, the 
newly reproduced strings are paired together at random. Secondly, an integer po-
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sition n along every pair of strings is selected uniformly at random. Finally, based 
on a probability of crossover, the paired strings undergo crossing over at the integer 
position n along the strings. This results in new pairs of strings that are created by 
swapping all of the characters between 1 and n inclusively. Although the crossover 
operator is a randomized event, when combined with reproduction it becomes an 
effective means of exchanging information and combining portions of good quality 
solutions. Reproduction and crossover give GAs most of their search power. The 
third operator, mutation, is simply an occasional random alteration of a string posi­
tion (based on the probability of mutation). In a binar}'  ^ code, this involves changing 
a 1 to a 0 and vice versa. The mutation operator helps in avoiding the possibility 
of mistaking a local minimum for a global minimum. When mutation is used spar­
ingly with reproduction and crossover, it improves the global nature of the genetic 
algorithm search.
At the first glance, it seems strange, or at least interesting, that such a simple 
mechanism should motivate anything useful; however, genetic algorithm is strictl}'  ^
inductive when compared with other search methods, which are ploddingly deductive. 
However, induction for its own sake is not a compelling argument to use for an}»^  
method, unless it can be shown how and when the method is likely to converge. 
Holland’s schema theorem places the theory of genetic algorithms on rigorous footing 
by calculating a bound on the growth of useful similarities or building blocks. The 
fundamental principle of GAs is to make good use of these similarity templates 
(Krishnakumar and Goldberg 1992).
The genetic algorithm we described is mostly applied to optimal control theory 
which involves the calculation of time paths for one or more variables in order to 
minimize or maximize some functional. However, for the problems where there are 
more than one player or controller, different algorithms need to be developed and/or 
used that consider the dynamics arising from the interactions among different de­
cision makers. Since the interests do not coincide, game-theoretic considerations 
become important. A solution concept from game theory which has been used a lot 
in economic applications is the noncooperative solution, or Nash equilibrium (Kyd- 
land 1975). The open-loop noncooperative solution is a sequence of decisions for each 
time period, and these decisions all depend on the initial state and in the presence 
of uncertainty on observed disturbances.
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To solve n-persons (3-persons) optimization problem in dynamic games, a Nash 
equilibrium is solved jointly for [st,pu,P 2t]·,  ^ =  0,1, ...,T  (Sargent 1987). Thus, we 
developed an algorithm in which GA is used to solve dynamic games for n-players.
Briefly, we have parallelly implemented n-separate genetic algorithms where each 
GA is used to solve the discrete optimal problem of the player in the game. Each 
player has its own evaluation function derived by substituting the constraints of 
that player to its own objective function. Naturally, in each evaluation function, the 
choice variables (strategies) of the other players causing conflicts are also included. In 
the open-loop Nash equilibria, each player takes the entire future path of the others’ 
(??. — 1 players) controls as given and choose its vector of optimal strategies over time. 
The North, in choosing {5i}i=o to maximize u(Cf^) subject to the dynamics of the 
system described in the model, takes K q and puG =  1,2 for i >  0 as given, while 
player i in the South in choosing {ptt}i=o to maximize u(C 'f'), takes the whole time 
paths of Si and Pjt,j: i^ as given. So, we used the solution procedure of both open-loop 
solutions and genetic algorithm in order to develope the algorithm described below^.
A genetic algorithm to solve a problem must have 5 components:
1. bit string (O’s and I ’s) representation of solutions of the problem,
2. a way to create an initial population of solutions,
3. an evaluation function that rate the solutions in terms of fitness,
4. genetic operators that generate new solutions and
5. values of the parameters that the genetic algorithm uses (population size, 
probabilities of applying genetic operators, etc.).
Initialization routines vary. For research purposes, a good deal can be learned by 
initializing a population randomly. Moving from a randomly created population to 
a well-adapted population is a good test of the algorithm, since the critical fea­
tures of the final solution will have been produced by the search and recombination 
mechanisms of the algorithm, rather than the initialization procedures. Hence, each 
player’s GA begins with the randomly generated policies of all parties.
In our experiment, the North calculates its initial evaluation function using ran-
®For details, see O zyildirim  (1997).
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dorrıly generated sequence of {puiP2i]J=o
¿=0
where is the North’s evaluation function at the 1 st iteration which contains 
the entire pricing policies of the Southern countries. The same initial procedure is 
applied to the Southern countries, where and are calculated using randomly 
generated {st,P2t}J=o Ut,Pit}J-=o respectively. Thus, in our three-country world, 
the initial best (6) results {Si,p\i,P2t}J=o obtained from randomly generated 
policies. The informations about the best strategies of the other players at each 
iteration are kept in the shared memory where each pla3^ er sends its best results 
and in exchange learns the best results of the other pla3'^ ers. Hence, each player 
uses the best strategies of the other players (n — 1) in each generation (or iteration) 
while solving its own problem. Here, still, the best does not mean the optimum 
for a particular functional. Thus, each side solves its problem and writes the best 
solutions to the shared memory and waits other sides to do the same thing. The 
waiting procedure is very important since each iteration or generation has to be 
evaluated synchronically. After copying the results of the other players, the problem 
of each player is to find the optimum time path of the variable(s) under investigation.
Using the close relation between the derivation of open-loop Nash equilibria and 
the problem of solving (jointly) n optimal control problems (Başar and Oldser, 1982), 
we used GA to optimize the control system of each pla3^ er. GA is a probabilistic 
algorithm which maintains a population of individuals, P{t) — { x j , ..., where 
Xi — Each individual, x,· represents a potential solution vector to the
problem at hand. Each solution vector is evaluated to give some measure of its fitness 
(utility value). Then, a new population is formed by selecting the more fit solutions 
(individuals). Some members of the new population undergo transformations by 
means of genetic operators (crossover, mutation) to form the new solution set. This 
procedure is repeated until the global optimum is converged for the problem under 
investigation.
It is crucial to understand that the evaluation functions are derived by substituting 
constraints into the objective functions of the particular problem, hence GA does not 
use first-order conditions to derive the optimal strategies for each player.
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Even, if the whole solution algorithm seems strange, since GA is a highly parallel 
mathematical algorithm, it is very successful in solving n-person discrete dynamic 
games. Most computer programs consist of a control sequence (the instructions) 
and a collection of data elements. Large programs have tens of thousands, or even 
millions of data elements. There are opportunities for parallelism in both the control 
sequence and the collection of data elements. In the control sequc;nce, it is possible 
to identify threads of control that could operate independently, and thus on different 
processors. This is the method used for programming most multi|)rocessor comput­
ers. The primary problems with this approach are the difficulty of identifying and 
synchronizing these independent threads of control (Robertson 1987).
We used a similar idea for this particular Nash equilibria, where we have to solve 
the problem jointly as systems of equations. Hence, the whole system is divided into n 
(3, in this study) parallel systems and solved using the proved schema theory behind 
GA. Since both the theory and the findings satisfying the optimality conditions such 
as first order and second order conditions, we can immediately say GA works in the 
open-loop equilibria of the discrete dynamic games.
2.4 Optimal Strategies and Equilibrium Time Paths
The North’s maximization problem (1) will be solved for the rate of investment and 
the country f ’s problem {i =  1,2) (2) and (3) respectively in the South are solved 
for the term of trade using numerical analysis. For the numerical lesults, we have to 
specify some of the benchmark parameter values used;
a =  5 n = 4 r =  4 p  =  0.95 fV = 20
w =  l d =  0 (7 =  0.5 6  =  0.05 Ko =  100
In the benchmark parameter, unit cost of destroying excess production (cost of over­
age) in the Southern economies is set to d =  0 for simplicity. Thus, the subsistence 
level, or minimum level of price, will be pa >  2/6,, and according to the value of 
productivity parameter in the fth country of the South, the minimum offers will be 
determined.
The parameters necessary for the genetic algorithm, the crossover and the mu­
tation rates are 0.60 and 0.03 respectively. These rates are default rates in most of 
the genetic algorithms. All of the experiments are done for 500000 trials and for
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2’ =  12^ “ . Even the choice of planning horizon is arbitrary, the trade relations and 
commitments between three countries would be less informative for longer periods. 
In our analysis, we consider three representative cases:
2.4.1 Case 1: Identical Technologies in the South (bi = ¿2 )
Certain features of Southern economies are of particular relevance to the applicabil­
ity and implications of the various theories (Stewart 1984). These features all stem 
from lower levels of development. One of these features is that Southern economies 
are characterized by very substantial elements of inefficiency in terms of underem­
ployment of some resources and poor productivity of resources in use. As far as 
the South is concerned, the criteria for assessing international trade are generally 
broader than in much gains from trade literature, but the employment of resources 
is one obvious gain in any case.
We start our analysis assuming that two of the Southern economies are charac­
terized with the same production technology and productivity for producing raw 
material:
bi — 62 =  1
Thus, the minimum price for any of the Southern countries will be p,· >  2 ,i =  1,2 
With the benchmark parameters and the productivity parameter of the Southern 
technology, the optimal strategies for noncooperative three country game are sum­
marized in Table 2.1.
Both of the Southern economies offer minimum price according to the expected 
selection criterion for the North. Within symmetric technology in the South, no 
transaction and no transportation world, the optimal strategies of the noncooper- 
atively acting Southern economies will offer minimum price even at the end of the 
world (i =  T). Since the amount sold will be determined exogenously and randomly, 
the welfare u* of each Southern country would be different even though both offered 
the same price. Thus, in this experiment, the second Southern country trades and 
gains more, compared to the first country. However, if this experiment is repeated 
again, in this symmetric countries in the South, none of the Southern nations has 
guarantee of gaining trade with the North over other Southern nation.
' “ T h e  period  can b e taken as m onths or years
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Table 2.1: Optimal Strategies
t Pit P'2 t
0 1.000 2.816 2 . 0 0 0
1 1.000 2.000 2.247
2 1.000 2.000 2.345
3 1.000 2.000 2.000
4 1.000 2.000 2.000
5 1.000 2.651 2.000
6 0.990 2.000 2.000
7 0.996 2.000 2.000
8 0.988 2.000 2.000
9 0.961 2.000 2.000
10 0.874 2.000 2.000
11 0.576 2.000 2.000
12 0.000 2.000 2.000
u* 25868 25481 49325
Over the 12 periods, the North saves all in the early periods and grows then 
consumes fifteen percent of their output after ten periods and consumes all at the 
end of planning horizon. In this numeric study, we didn’t specify any end value for 
the state variables but specified only the end of period, and the optimal strategy at 
the end of the period is determined within the model.
The stationary values for this game are reached within less than ten periods;
Pit ~  P2t ~ 2, 5^— 1
2.4.2 Case 2: Different Technologies in the South (bi ^ h^ )
As producers become increasingly dependent on the South markets, developments in 
the South will have a commensurately larger effect on output in rich countries. Thus 
improved terms of trade or rising productivity in the South will reduce the cost of 
the North’s imports, giving consumers a boost in real income. In this section, we 
allow one of the Southern economies to be more productive:
=  2 62 — 1
Thus, the minimum prices will be pu > 1 and p2t > 2 for all t. Then, the optimal 
strategies for asymmetric South case are summarized in Table 2.2. The impact of 
improved terms of trade in one of the Southern economies, boosts the annual income
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Table 2.2: Optimal Strategies 
1^ •‘>'i Pu p2t
0 1.000 1.016
1 1.000 1.008
2 1.000 1.055
3 1.000 1.008
4 1.000 1.061
5 1.000 1.047
6 0.996 1.016
7 0.988 1.016
8 0.949 1.016
9 0.937 1.008
10 0.874 1.031
11 0.498 1.596
12 0.000 1.988
140910 231290 0
of the trading countries. Hence, even though the saving behavior of the North is 
similar to the previous case, in terms of aggregate income, the trade is strongly 
beneficial for the North and the productive South. The welfare of the both nations 
are increased, while the less productive Southern country is not able to sell and 
earns zero utility. So, the best policy for that country will be either to increase its 
productivity or to specialize in the production of another competitive good.
The pricing of extractive resources has traditionally been the source of North- 
South conflict, with the exporting South trying for better prices and the North 
resisting the South. Changes in the price of some resources such as oil, however, 
have forgoed a strong interdependence between the North and the South, both in 
real and in financial markets. There is now common interest between exporters 
and importers in keeping prices within a reasonable range neither too high nor too 
low (Chichilnisky and Heal 1986). In this experiment, we observed that the pricing 
policy of the productive Southern country is to offer low price for the periods when 
the North saves and grows rapidly and then to increase the price slightly less than 
the minimum price that can be offered by the other Southern country. The result 
can be taken as supportive to the neoclassical view since we clearly observed welfare 
gain from the trade of the two nations in the three-country world.
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2.4.3 Case 3: Cooperation in the South
Suppose now that two players in the South agree to cooperate for minimizing the 
risk and maximizing their intertemporal utility. In three-players game, a subset of 
the player set (2 C 3) is called a coalition. In the world described in this study, the 
same type Southern countries under risk act cooperatively before determining their 
pricing policies. By coalition, they will get rid of excess usage of their resources in 
the production of one good. Also, by the elimination of possible cost of overage.
Pt >  w l h ,  bi — b2 =  h
and the problem becomes
North:
T
max p^u(Cl^) (4)
t -O
subject to
Kt+i =  [Yt — w(Nt — N) — ptRt]st +  (1 — S)Kt 
=  [Y^  -  w{Nt -  N) -  ptRt]{l -  St)
Ko given and 0 < 5f < 1 
South :
max E A ( c f ) (5)
i= 0
subject to
Ah+i =  [Yt -w{Nt-N)-ptRt]st  + { l - 6 )Kt
C f  =  ptRt
Ko given
In our experiment, using the technology where 6 = 1 ,  the minimum prices are pt >  1 
for all t. Hence, with the reduction in the resource prices the trade between North 
and South becomes beneficial for all parties (Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3: Optimal Strategies
t St P t
0 1.000 1.023
1 1.000 1.047
2 1.000 1.016
3 1.000 1.031
4 1.000 1.008
5 1.000 1.016
6 1.000 1.008
7 1.000 1.000
8 0.918 1.031
9 0.839 1.016
10 0.435 1.196
11 0.071 2.451
12 0.000 2.976
u * 70628 183400
Assuming that both of the Southern countries share equally the welfare gain from 
the trade, it is found that the welfare of each country is u* =  91700, ¿ =  1,2 which is 
higher than the one in noncooperative symmetric case. Hence, as compared to the 
Case 1 where technologies are same in the Southern countries, all of the three players 
gain from cooperative strategies. Thus, the elimination of random shock in demand 
lowered the prices but increased the trade and welfare of the parties in the game.
2.5 Conclusion
The sharp pricing shocks of the 1970s raised the attention to the possible conflicts 
of interests between resource exporters and importers. As well as having common 
interests in certain types of price movements, exporters and importers shared influ­
ence over the price movements. They should design their economic policies so as to 
use their joint influences to pursue common interest.
The dynamic aspects of economic interdependence have invited the application 
of dynamic game theory. To characterize the relations between the players in the 
North-South interactions, we examined the symmetric equilibria of Nash differential 
games, open-loop, using GA. The noncooperative equilibria have been compared 
with the cooperative equilibrium in non-coordinated resource pricing and investment 
strategies.
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Ill the model presented here, international coalition leads to djmarnically efficient 
trade relation within the three-country world. The welfare impacts of the cooperation 
are obvious.
Although the solution algorithm studied in this chapter is designed for non-convex 
dynamic games, the model itself is simple; extensions in the direction of generating a 
rich model structure will be desirable. And, finally, future research might profitably 
examine the terminal condition where all the economies reach stability. Instead of 
solving the game where the world will end at the end of T periods, we have to solve 
the game that the terminal periods for each country are chosen where the economies 
reach their stable equilibria. However, since the aim of this study is to introduce a 
new technique for solving dynamic games where the terminal conditions are rather 
certain by either targets of decision variables or periods, we disregard the choice of 
terminal conditions in this study. Nevertheless if the equilibrium states and when 
the economies reach to these states are known, the adjustment is straightforward.
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A Genetic Game of Trade, Growth and 
Externalities
3.1 Introduction
It is by now a standard practice in economic modeling to applji^  results from optimal 
control theory to economic dynamics. When dynamics involve optimization of con­
trols over time by a single controller, the application is immediate. If , however, there 
are multiple controllers then dynamic game theory provides a framework for model­
ing and sets the appropriate tools for optimal decisions under various environment. 
(Başar and Olsder 1982) The solution concepts involve optimization of functionals, 
either over time or stage wise at each point in time. The former requires results from 
optimal control theory to be used.
With the recent advances in computer technology, there has also been a growing 
awareness and interest in the computational aspects of complex dynamic structures 
which can not be easily handled with the traditional analytical methods (Judd 1992). 
Most widely used numerical techniques to optimize control problems today are either 
calculus-based or enumerativo. Both have short-comings: calculus-based techniques 
require derivatives and they are only local, i.e., the extrema they seek are the ones 
closer to the current point. Enumerativo schemes that have been developed to over­
come these drawbacks lack efficiency because many practical search spaces are too 
large to search one at a time. Random search techniques that narrow the search 
space have been shown to fare no better than the enumerativo schemes in the long 
run (Krishnakumar and Goldberg 1992).
One search technique that is both global and robust over a broad spectrum of 
problems is the genetic algorithm. Genetic algorithm search combines a Darwinian 
survival-of-the-fittest strategy to eliminate unfit characteristics and uses random in­
formation exchange, with exploitation of the knowledge contained in the old solu­
tions, to affect the search mechanism with surprising power and speed.
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Many search techniques require much auxiliary information in order to work prop­
erly. For example, gradient techniques, as mentioned above, need derivatives (cal­
culated both analytically and numerically) in order to be able to climb the current 
peak. Other local search procedures like the greedy techniques of combinatorial op­
timization require access to most if not all tabular parameters. By contrast. Genetic 
algorithms have no need for all this auxiliary information: GAs are blind. To perform 
an effective search for better and better structures, they only require payoff functions 
(measures of fitness) associated with decision variables (Krishnakumar and Goldberg 
1992).
Michalewicz (1992) devised a GA to optimize control problems with a single con­
troller. Ozyildirim (1996) extented GA to solve open-loop difference games of finite 
horizon. In this chapter a general purpose GA is developed to solve open-loop differ­
ential games of infinite duration. The lack of attention paid to the development of 
computational techniques to solve such problems was first addressed by Pau (1975a, 
1975b).
Numerical solutions using genetic algorithm, necessarily require reformulating the 
problem into a discrete finite horizon approximation. In general, this transformation 
involves two types of decisions: the length of the finite planning horizon (the transient 
phase) and the treatment of post terminal behavior (the stationär}' phase). Errors on 
the optimal trajectory that will result from discrete-time approximation may be re­
duced by increasing the length of the decision horizon with a resulting hoost'm compu­
tational costs. Mercenier and Michel (1994), propose time aggregation to transform 
continous time infinite horizon optimal control problems to discrete-time approxi­
mation with the same steady-state. This property imposes consistency constraints 
on the joint formulation of preferences and accumulation equations. It is shown that 
this consistency is achieved by simple restriction on the choice of discount factor. We 
show that their results extend to control problems with multiple controllers. Then 
we exploit the inherent parallelism in GA to solve the time-aggregated finite-time 
difference games.
The second objective of the chapter is to lay out a model of a two-region, North/South, 
dynamic trade game in the same vein as Galor (1986). North specializes in the pro­
duction of a single good which is consumed, invested (only in the North) and traded 
(at the terms of trade decided by the South) for an essential resource produced only
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by the South. As different from Galor, however, the game extends indefinetely into 
future so that there is no arbitrariness as to the ending of the game. Also knowl­
edge, broad capital, accumulated in the North diffuses, albeit at a diminishing rcxte, 
to check the damage done to the Southern environment from resource extraction. 
Thus, patterns of trade and growth are further complicated by the presence of local 
and transboundary externalities. In a dynamic game setup with transboundary pol­
lution, Dockner and Long (1993) found that Pareto-efficient steady-state pollution 
level can be sustained with non-linear Markow-Perfect strategies if discount rates 
are sufficiently small. Bag (1996) analyzes incentives to free-ride on transboundary 
abatements when there are informational asymmetries. Thus, the chapter aims to 
contribute to the recent literature exploring the linkages between international trade, 
environmental degradation and growth by bringing to the fore the dynamic gaming 
aspects of these issues (Markusen 1975, Clemhout and Wan 1985, Conrad and Clark 
1987, Ludema and Wooton 1994, Lopez 1994).
As different from the studies which analyze the said externalities in a static frame­
work (Milliman and Prince 1994, Diwan and Safadi 1992, Low and Shafik 1992, Alpay 
and Sağlam 1996), the knowledge accumulation brings about additional intertempo­
ral tradeoffs thus pointing to additional sources of inefficiencies. Today’s price and 
investment policies via their effects on the rate of knowledge accumulation determine 
the feasibility of tomorrow’s prices and investment. Consequently, optimality here is 
in reference to the whole time profile of the policies, i.e., the policies must be optimal 
in their time sequence as well.
In the search for optimal policies two modes of behavior are considered: non- 
cooperative and cooperative. In the non-cooperative Nash search, each region is 
represented by an artificially intelligent CA to adopt policies taking the rival’s as 
given. Choices are evaluated in terms of their impact on the respective fitness func­
tions, ignoring the side effects on the rival’s fitness. Policies are then iteratively 
improved upon using a synchronous Darwinian search mechanism. Fittest policies 
are found if no improvement in “life time” fitnesses is possible.
South chooses resource prices with a view to maximize her own fitness. Resource 
prices also affect the rate of knowledge accumulation and hence the Northern welfare 
which however does not enter into South’s calculus of price determination. Likewise 
in its search for optimal resource/knowledge mix, the Northern intertemporal cal-
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cuius ignores the fact that there are detrimental side effects of resource use to the 
Southern environment and also that knowledge accumulation reduces these effects. 
As such, Northern policies will exacerbate pollution in the South, and Southern 
policies will retard growth in the North. It is worth noting here that though en­
vironmental pollution is local in nature, it has global ramifications calling for an 
international approach to appropriately internalize it.
In the cooperative search, the world fitness is represented as a weighted sum of 
each region’s respective fitnesses. Consequently, all externalities are internalized. 
The resulting price and resource/knowledge paths are efficient as they are optimal 
relative to a global fitness.
Cooperative solutions may be difficult to achieve for various reasons e.g., lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, high monitoring costs, etc. We show that with a suffi­
ciently strong knowledge difussion, even if the parties act noncooperatively, there 
are substantial welfare gains to be obtained by both parties over cooperation with 
restricted knowledge spillover. This indicates that the extent of knowledge spillover 
is crucial in determining the long-run fortunes of the regions in question. Hence a 
unilateral act by the North which lifts barriers to dissemination of knowledge related 
to pollution abatement would be welfare improving for both regions.
In the model we consider, environmental pollution and knowledge stock appear 
in the Southern fitness, but external to the North. Hence the terms of trade chosen 
by the South incorporate the local costs and benefits of these externalities as well 
as a monopoly rent due to sole ownership of resources. Consequently, inefficiencies 
stemming from noncooperative Northern behavior are partly reduced, though not 
completely eliminated, leaving South’s exercise of monopoly power over resource 
pricing as the major source of dynamic ineflBciency. Monopoly pricing results in 
a lower resource/knowledge mix than warranted by a global efficiency measure. It 
inhibits growth as well as the volume of trade between the regions.
The balance of the chapter is organized as follows: The Genetic Algorithm to 
solve open loop dynamic games is described in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses the 
dynamic trade game between North and South. Section 3.4 contains the numerical 
results and Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Genetic Algorithm
Genetic Algorithm initiated by Holland and further extended by De Jong is best 
viewed in terms of optimizing a sequential decision process involving uncertainty 
in the form of lack of a priori knowledge, noisy feedback and time varying payoff 
function (De Jong 1993).
The genetic algorithm is a highly parallel mathematical algorithm that transforms 
a set of (population) individual mathematical objects (typically fixed length char­
acter strings patterned after chromosome strings), each with an associated fitness 
value, into a new population (i.e., the next generation) using operations patterned 
after Darwinian principles of reproduction and survival of the fittest after naturally 
occurring genetic operations.
A GA performs a multi-directional search by maintaining a population of indi­
viduals, P(t) =  {x i,...,a ;„} where Xi =  {a:,i,...,Xjt}; each individual, X( represents 
a potential solution vector to the problem at hand. An objective function (fitness) 
plays the role of an environment to discriminate between “fit” and “unfit” solutions. 
The population undergoes a simulated evolution: at each generation the relatively 
“fit” solutions reproduce while the relatively “unfit” solutions die.
The structure of a simple genetic algorithm is as follows: During iteration i, 
a genetic algorithm maintains a population of potential solutions; (chromosomes, 
vectors). Each solution x\ is evaluated to give some measure of its fitness. Then a 
new population (iteration t - f l )  is formed by selecting the more fit individuals. Some 
members of this new population undergo reproduction by means of crossover and 
mutation., to form new potential solutions.
Crossover combines the features of two parent chromosomes to form two similar 
offspring by swapping corresponding segments of the parents. The intuition behind 
the applicability of the crossover operator is the information exchange between dif­
ferent potential solutions. A simple crossover follows reproduction in three steps. 
First, the newly reproduced strings are paired together at random. Second, an inte­
ger position k along every pair of strings is selected uniformly at random. Finally, 
based on a probability of crossover, the paired strings undergo crossing over at the 
integer position k along the string. This results in the new pairs of strings that are 
created by swapping all of the characters between characters between characters 1
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and k inclusively. As an example, consider two strings X  and Y  of length 5, mated 
at random, if the random draw chooses position 3, the resulting ci ossover yields two 
new strings, X* and Y*, after the crossover:
Before Crossover After Crossover
X 0 0 0 1 1 A* 1 1 1 1 1
Y 1 1 1 0 0 Y* 0 0 0 0 0
Mutation arbitrarily alters one or more genes of a selected chromosome by a 
random change with a probability equal to the mutation rate pmut. The intuition 
behind the mutation operator is the introduction of some extra variability into the 
population. After some number of generations, the program converges- the best 
individual hopefully represents the optimum solutions“ .
3.2.1 Genetic Algorithm For Noncooperative Open-Loop Dynamic Games
A prime example of a dynamic game equilibrium where optimal control directly 
applies is the open-loop Nash equilibrium in differential games. Each player faces 
a standard optimal control problem, which is arrived at by fixing the other players’ 
policies at some arbitrary functions. Hence, each such optimal control problem is 
parameterized in terms of some open-loop control policies which, however, do not 
alter the structure of the underlying optimization problems because of their open- 
loop character. Therefore, in principle, the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for 
open-loop Nash equilibria can be obtained by listing down the conditions required 
by each optimal control problem (via minimum principle) and then requiring that 
these all be satisfied simultaneously (Starr and Ho 1969). Because of the couplings 
that exist between these various conditions, each one corresponding to the optimal 
control problem faced by one player, solution of a Nash differential game equilibria, 
analytically or numerically, is several orders of magnitude more difficult than solving 
single controller optimal control problems (Başar 1986).
In general, the task of designing and implementing algorithms for the solution 
of optimal control problems is a difficult one. However, GA is recently applied to 
the traditional optimal control theorems by Michalewicz (1992) where everything 
is singular in the sense that there is one criterion to be optimized, one controller
" F o r  further details, see G oldberg (1989), M ichalewicz (1992), A rifovic (1994)
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coordinating all control actions, and one information set available to the controller. 
Considering the tact that GA is a highly parallel mathematical algorithm, we offer a 
new solution procedure using GA to visualize situations or problems in which there 
are more than one performance measure and more than one intelligent controller 
(player) operating with or without coordination from others. Thus, we use both the 
optimization and the learning property of the GA to solve the problems of multiple 
criteria optimization (game theory) for the players receiving no information during 
the play (open-loop control) in a dynamic environment. The type of equilibrium con­
trols studied here are conflicting Nash-Cournot equilibrium where the Nash control 
is the best control for each player if it is assumed that all the other players (n-1) are 
holding firm to their own Nash controls.
The necessary conditions for the existence of equilibria in generalized dynamic 
games under simultaneous play can be found in Başar and Oldser (1982), Starr 
and Ho (1969), and Pindyck (1977) (see Appendix). Here we discuss the numerical 
approximation of the open loop equilibrium solutions as developed by Ozyildinm 
(1996, 1997).
Since the open-loop n-person Nash equilibria can be obtained as the joint solution 
to n optimal control problems (Başar and Oldser 1982), then we can use nCAs to 
optimize the control system of each player.
In this environment, there are n artifically intelligent players (controller) who up­
date their strategies through GA and a referee, or a Active player, who administers 
the parallel implementation of the algorithm and acts as an intermediary for the 
exchange of best response of each player to the actions of the players in each gen­
eration. This Active player (shared memory) has no decisive role but provides the 
best strategies in each iteration to the requested parties synchronously. In making 
his decisions, each player has certain expections as to what the other players will 
do. These expectations are shaped through the information received from the shared 
memory in each iteration.
We parallelly implement n-separate genetic algorithms where each GA is used to 
solve the discrete optimal control problem of one player in the game. Each player 
has her own fitness (evaluation function) which, naturally, incorporates the (possi­
bly conflicting) controls of the other players. In the open-loop Nash equilibria, each 
player takes the entire future path of the others’ (n — 1 players) controls as given
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and chooses a vector of optimal strategies over time. After initialization with ran­
dom choices, the information about the best strategies of the other players for later 
iterations are kept in the shared memory where each player sends its best results 
and in exchange learns the best results of the other players. Hence, each player 
uses the best strategies of the other players (n — 1) in each generation (or iteration) 
while solving her own problem. Here, still, the best does not mean the optimum 
for a particular functional. Thus, each side solves its problem and writes the best 
solutions to the shared memory and waits other sides to do the same thing. Waiting 
procedure is very important since each iteration or generation has to be evaluated 
synchronuously. After copying the results of the other players, the problem of each 
player is to find the optimum time path of the variable(s) under investigation. The 
most crucial part in this algorithm is that the problems of each player are solved 
synchronously. Since we have n different players with different objectives, the prob­
lem of each player varies. Thus, based on the complexity of the fitness function, one 
player might evaluate the performance of his strategies faster than the other pla}''ers. 
However, in order to learn the action of the other players against his strategies, each 
player waits for the other player’s action in each generation. Thus the game must 
be played synchronously and genetic operators must be applied sequentially to each 
generation.
Since GA is a highl}  ^parallel mathematical algorithm, it is very successful in solv­
ing n-person discrete dynamic games. Most computer programs consist of a control 
sequence (the instructions) and a collection of data elements. Large programs have 
tens of thousands, or even millions of data elements. There are opportunities for 
parallelism in both the control sequence and the collection of data elements. In 
the control sequence, it is possible to identify threads of control that could operate 
independently, and thus on different processors. This is the method used for pro­
gramming most multiprocessor computers. The primary problem with this approach 
is the difficulty of identifying and synchronizing these independent threads of control 
(Robertson 1987).
We use a similar idea for the approximation of dynamic Nash equilibria where we 
have to solve the problem jointly as systems of equations. Hence, the whole system 
is divided into n parallel systems and solved using the proved schema theory behind 
GA.
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The following figure shows the general outline of the algorithm we use for the 
two-region dynamic trade game:
procedure North GA; 
begin
initialize PN(0) 
randomly initialize 
shared memory; 
synchronize; 
evaluate PN(0); 
t = 1; 
repeat
select PN(t) from PN(t-l); 
copy best to shared memory; 
synchronize;
crossover and mutate PN(t); 
evaluate PS(t); 
t=t+l;
until(termination condition) 
end;
procedure SouthGA; 
begin
initialize PS(0); 
randomly initialize 
shared memory; 
synchronize; 
evaluate PS(0); 
t = 1; 
repeat
select PS(t) from PS(t-l); 
copy best to shared memory; 
synchronize;
crossover and mutate PS(t); 
evaluate PS(t); 
t=t+l;
until(termination condition); 
end;
In the above algorithm, each side waits for the presence of the previous best 
structure of the other side in the synchronize statement.
Both players share their results while solving their own problems. This is done b}' 
using a shared memory that contains the best solution of each side. Each side solves 
her own problem and writes the best solution to the shared memory and waits for 
the other side to do the same. Then it copies the result of the other side’s solution 
and continues solving its problem.
In each step of this algorithm, two GAs are solved. Its time complexity is very 
high. In order to reduce this time complexity, these two GAs are solved for one 
generation. Thus they continuously share the best results while solving their problem. 
This approach has two advantages. First it reduces the time complexity; second, it 
guarantees the convergence to a global extreme.
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3.2.2 Genetic Algorithm For Cooperative Games
In a cooperative game, the strategic rivalry that exists in noncooperative games is 
eliminated by invoking a fictive social planner who maximizes the “total fitness” 
which is the weighted sum of each player’s respective fitness. Thus, we can solve 
typical control problems by standard GA techniques (Krishnakurnar and Goldberg 
1992 and Michalewicz 1992).
In general, controls may involve constraints so that, either penalty functions or 
substitution may be used to transform the original problem to an unconstrained opti­
mization problem. Thus, we have evaluation (performance index) or fitness function 
for GA implementation. A GA performs the following steps to optimize a control 
problem: (1) Randomly generate an initial potential solution set, (2) Suppose we 
have n control variables, T periods and m potential solutions for each nT variables 
in each generation, evaluate the fitness value for a solution set of nTm, (3) Apply 
selection, crossover, and mutation operations to each set of solutions to reproduce a 
new population, (4) Repeat steps (1), (2) and (3) until computation is terminated 
according to a convergence criterion, (5) Choose the solution set nT based on the 
best fitness value from the current generations as the optimal solution set.
3.3 Description of the Model
3.3.1 Non-Cooperative Model of Behavior
Consider a global economy comprised of two regions namely. North and South. Em­
ploying a concave production technology Y  — F{K,  R^u), North produces manu­
factured goods which are either consumed and invested in the North or exported 
to the South at a fixed world price of unity. K  stands for broad capital measuring 
the current state of technical knowledge in the North (Griliches, 1979), R is the raw 
material imported at a monopoly price determined by the South and u captures all 
other uncounted determinants of output.
The state of knowledge accumulates in pace with the rate of investment,
k t =  Y t - P t R t - 8 K t - C f  (6)
where p< is the relative price of resources (Southern terms of trade), 0 < i  < 1 is
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the rate of depreciation of the broad capitah'" .^ Henceforth, a dot over a variable 
denotes its time derivative while superscripts M  and S stand for North and South 
respectively. Equation (1) shows that the pace of knowledge accumulation will be 
determined not only by the desired consumption profile in the North, but also in 
the South. Although no investment takes place in the South so that proceeds from 
the resource sale are totally consumed. South nonetheless indirectly contributes to 
knowledge accumulation via its choice of resource price.
Northern optimal consumption plan maximizes the discounted Northern lifelong 
welfare (fitness)
poo
max /  U i C f )
C f , R t J o
PM < I
subject to Equation (1) and /t"(0) =  Ko given, C f  >  0 for all t.
U { C f )  is the instantaneous felicity satisfying the usual Inada conditions and pj  ^
denotes the Northern time preference rate.
We assume endowment asymmetry in that primary resource is only produced in 
the South. The output of raw material is postulated by a constant returns to scale 
production function and is assumed, for simplicit}^, to be a fixed coefficient type 
Rt =  bLt, b > 0 where Lt is the labor employed at time t.
Resource extraction causes pollution, V  at the rate
I K * (7)
where 7 > 1 , 0 < < ^ < 1. 7 measures the exponential order of environmental damage 
due to extraction and is a knowledge diffusion (spillover) parameter, signifing the 
degree of applicability of knowledge to pollution reduction.
The type of pollution we are considering has a high natural decay rate so that 
cumulative effects are underplayed. With a special case of this sort, the magnitude 
of the stock becomes proportional to the size of the flow defined as in Keeler, Spence 
and Zeckhauser (1972) and Markusen (1975)^^.
^^The question of depreciation of the knowledge capital at the national level is discussed extensively by Griliches 
(1979) and interpreted as either th at only a fraction of current technology flow is to be thought as a net addition 
to the soci2d stock of knowledge capital or that some fraction of the preexisting stock of this capital is replaced 
(depreciated) annuгJly.
^^It is assum ed th at the supply of labor in the South is perfectly elastic at a fixed real wage w in term s of the
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V  enters into the Southern utility as a flow with a negative marginal utility. Given 
the Northern demand for resources, South chooses the terms of trade to maximize 
lifetime utility
poo
max /  [U{Cf  
Jo
subject to Equations (1), (2) and
0 <  /95 <  1
C f =  ptRt
K{0) =  Ko given, Cf  >  0 for all t.
ps is the Southern time preference. Instantaneous utility is assumed separable in 
consumption, C f  and pollution Vt so that U(Cf,Vt)  =  U{Cf )  — D{Vt)· U{Cf )  is 
strictly concave in C f  and D{Vt)  is strictly increasing in Rt and decreasing in Ki-
3.3.2 Cooperative Behavior
The problem in designing cooperative strategies is to establish the potential gains the 
participants to stand to gain and how an acceptable distribution of those gains will 
be achieved. This distribution depends on the weights that are put on the respective 
flttnesses, u>. The value of tu most likely to prevail in a cooperative agreement 
requires some bargaining which recognizes the relative power of the participants. 
This is outside the scope of this study.
Pareto-efficient solution is found by maximizing
poo
max /  u;UiCf)  +  (1 -  oj)[U{Cf)  -  D{Vt)]e-^'dt
C f , R t , p t  J o
subject to
Kt =  Y t - p t R t - 8 K t - C f  
K{0)  =  Ko given C f , C f > 0
p =  u>pj^  +  (1 ~  is the weighted time preference term.
0 <  /9 < 1
(8)
m anufacturing goods. The nature of the labor force coupled with the C R T S production function determ ines the 
labor incom e per unit of raw m aterial produced at a fixed level w/b. Com petitive firms in the South at any point in 
tim e would then have charged a price equal to the private m arginal cost o f resom ce extraction w/b. The assumed 
social planner in the South levies an export tax, not only to internalize the social cost of pollution, but also to extract 
m onopoly profit from  the North.
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Cooperative search takes place on the premise that South and North can enter into 
a binding commitment. Precommitment is difficult in the absence of suitable institu­
tions which can enforce global decisions. Nonetheless, cooperative solutions, though 
they lack credibility, are important so far as they establish an efficient benchmark 
against which other solutions can be compared.
3.4 Numerical Experiment
Numerical solutions using genetic algorithm, necessarily require reformulating the 
problem into a discrete finite horizon approximation. We generalize the result by 
Mercenier and Michel (1994) to transform continuous time infinite horizon control 
problems to discrete-time approximation for multi-player control jiroblems:
3.4.1 Discrete-Time Approximation of the Model with Steady State In­
variance
In the original paper by Mercenier and Michel (1994), a general continuous-time 
multi-dimensional infinite horizon inter temporal problem with state vector x{t)  G iP® 
and control vector u{t) G 3?”
ЛО О
max /  e~^^g{x{t)^u{t))dt
Jo
s.t. x{t) =  f {x{ t ) ,u{t ) ) ,  a:(0) =  a:o given
in which they assume existing interior stationary solution ( i ,û ,ç )  characterized by
/ ( i , û )  =  0, pq =  \/хН{х,й), and VuH{x,u)  — 0 (9)
where H{x,u)  =  g{x,u) +  f { x , u Y ‘^  is the Hamiltonian, q{t) G is the vector of 
undiscounted shadow prices associated with the dynamic constraints, and, V,,· and 
V „ are the gradients with respect to x and и respectively. The objective of the 
paper is to study the relationship that exists between (x ,û ,ç ) and the stationary 
equilibrium of the discrete version of the above problem. The discrete-time problem 
with same stationary solution will be the following:
OO
max ^  впАпд{х(1п), u{tn))
n=0
denotes transpose of a vector
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3.t. .x(i„+i) -  x(in) = Anf(x(tn),u(in)), x{to) =  Xo given
whei'e A „  is a scalar factor that converts the continuous flow in a stock increment and 
would be the length of time interval (A „ =  — in). Hence, the discount factors
On lor which the stationary solution of the continuous-time problem is a stationary 
solution of the discrete-time problem has a recurrence relation deiived from the the 
optimality conditions of the Lagrangian of the discretized problem:
A „V „{.g(.x(f„),u (i„)) +  q{tnf  =  0
-6n-iq{tn-i) + Onq{tn) + OnAn{'^x{g{x{tn),u{tn)) + q{tn)'^f{x(tn),uitn))} =  0
such that from (9), the first condition is satisfied by (x,u , 9) and the second ma}  ^ be 
equivalently written as
On-iq =  Onq +  On/^ nPq
Thus, the necessary and sufficient restrictions on the discount factor are derived so 
that both finite horizon discrete-time approximation and an infinite horizon continuous­
time optimization problem have the same steady state. These conditions apply re­
gardless of the dimension of the state space and of the time grid.
In our study, we applied the same discretization and the same recurrence relation 
for the solutions of the differential games introduced. The general representation for 
two player game will be as follows:
Player 1:
max /  e '^^^gi{x{t).,ui{t).,U2 {t))dt 
Jo
(10)
s.t. x{t) =  f {x{ t ) ,ui { t ) ,U2 {t)), x(0) =  Xo given
Player 2:
max f o~P2tg2{,x{t),ui{t),U2{t))dt (11)
s.t. x(i) = /(x (i) ,t t i(i) ,it2(i)), x(0) =  xo given
For noncooperative solution, the stationary equilibrium (x ,u i,U 2, <71, 92) of the prob­
lem (5) and (6) will be characterized by
/(x ,U i,U 2) =  0 piqi =  '\/xH^{x,Ui,U2) V „ii/^ (x,U i,U 2) =  0
/(x ,l i i ,U 2) =  0 /9292 =  Vxif^(x,Ui,U2) « 1, « 2) =  0 ( 12)
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where (x ,u i,U 2) =  gi{x,Ui,U2) +  q( f{x,гı¡,гl2 ) and U],U2) =  g'2 {x,ui,U2 ) +
(/2/ ( x ,  Ui, U2) are the Hamiltonian for the first and second player respectively.
The discretization of the above problem which would have the same stationary 
equilibrium of the continuous one, is the following:
Player 1:
00
max E OlAngi{x{tn), n,] ?/,2(f„))
n=0
s.t. x (i„+i) -  x (f„) =  A „ /(x ( i„ ) ,u i( /„ ) ,U 2(i„)), x(io) =  a;o given 
Player 2:
00
max ^  0f, Ang2 {x{tn),ui{tn), « 2(^n))
n=0
s.t. x{tn+i) -  x{tn) =  A „ /(x (f„ ) ,U i(i„ ) ,i i2(i„)), x{to) =  xq given 
From the Lagrangians of the discretized problems:
00
^  ^ (^(^n)? 1^ (^n)) '^ 2(^ 71))
n=0
+qi{tny\Anf{x{tn),Ui{tn),U2{tn)) +  x{tn) -  a;(in+i)]}
and
00
0l{Ang2{x{tn),Ui{tn), U2(tn))
n=0
“t"92(^ Ti) (^n)? ^l(^n)5 ^2(^ 71)) “t" (^^ 7i) (^^7г4-l)]}
the optimality conditions for an interior solution are:
A „V „,{i?i(x (i„),u i(i„),U 2(in )) +  9i(in)^/(a;(in),w i(in),«2(in))} =  0 
+  ^hqi{in)
+^^A„{ V^{^l(x(i„), Mi(in), W2(in))) + q i { t n f  f(x{tn),  Ml(in), «2(^ 71))} = 0
and
AfiVjij {^2(^(^n)) 1^ {tn}j ^2(^n)) T 92( 7^1) y^ (^ (^ 7i)) ^2(^7t))} 0
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—On^\q2{t,n-\) +  Ol^ q^ itn)
+0lAn'^x{g2{x{tn),Ul{tn),U2{tn))) +  q2iinff{x{tn),Ui{tn),U2{tn))} =  0
From ( 12) the first and third conditions are satisfied by (x,ui,v.2 ,qi,q2 ) and the 
second and the fourth may be equivalently written as
+  ^l^npiq\
=  0 %  +  0lAnp2q2
from which the recurrence relations for Ol^  and 0^  are
n > 0 and 0l =  ....3 r \  n > 0 
”· l +  PiAn ” l + p 2An
for any Oq  ^ Oq > .^
In the cooperative analysis, the application of the recurrence relation will be the 
same as the one introduced by Mercenier and Michel.
For computational purposes, the discretization of problem (10) and (11) will in­
volve the arbitrary choice of a time horizon of finite length. The finite horizon 
discrete-time problem is 
N - l
max ^  <9),A„(7,(a:(f„),ui(i„),U2(f„))-f ^NG'‘(A"(fyv)) i =  1,2
n = 0
s.t. a;(f„+i) -  a:(f„) =  A n /(a :(/„),u i(i„),? i2(i„)), ^ < n < N - l ,  xq given
The steady-state invariance property imposes specific restrictions on the choice of 
functions G'‘{.). In terms of economic interpretation, the value of terminal state is 
the discounted sum of the constant flows that it generates
G =  i
Jo
1
e ^'^gi{x,Ui{x),U2 {x))dt =  —gi{x,Ui{x),U2 {x))
p i
and =  Gn - x··
For our model, the discrete-time approximation of finite horizon two-region model 
with steady state invariance will be as follows for each region i =  A/”, S :
N - l
max -h eN-iG^{I<{tN))  (13)
n=0
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subject to
K { t ^ + r ) - K { t n )  = A n [ Y i t n ) - p { t n ) R { t n ) - C ^ ^ { Q - S K { t n ) ]
K{to) — I<o given C '> 0 (14)
where is the discount factor of the region and the sequence of discount factors 
for which the stationary solution of the continuous-time optimization problem is 
a stationary solution of the discrete-time problem. The sequences are unique within 
the choice of 0·  ^ and and they are defined by the following recurrence:
0^ >Q  and9^ =  ^ > 0 
" 1 +  °1 +
An is a scalar factor that converts the continuous flow into a stock increment. A 
may be the length of the time interval, A „ =  tn+i — tn, but, the specific choice of 
A,, plays no role in the sequel and the developments that follow are independent of 
the chosen grid. Finally, the functions G‘ (.) denote the value of terminal state where 
steady-state is already reached. Thus, we used the time aggregated approximation 
to handle the differential game with moderate size but constrained by computational 
capacities that limit the number of time intervals until steady-state is reached.
3.4.2 Terminal Condition
The role of terminal or transversality conditions in the solution of the economic 
models has been subject of controversy in the literature (Schiller 1977). The main 
reasons for this revolve around questions of uniqueness and stability. Any model 
should have the characteristic that for any given inputs only one set of outputs, only 
one unique solution, should exist.
If we choose to represent economic activity by means of diflferential or difference 
equations and a set of boundary conditions, the representation can be described as 
well posed if two criteria are satisfied. First the solution should be unique since 
experience suggests that a given set of economic circumstances leads to just one 
outcome. Secondly, the solution should be stable in the sense that an arbitrary small 
change in the boundary conditions should not result in explosive behavior. If the 
economic process under examination were dynamically unstable, then some trivial 
disturbances would cause the process to explode (Holy and Hughes-Hallett 1989). If 
the mathematical representation is non-unique or unstable then we must conclude
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that the problem is not well posed and could not be associated with economic process. 
The use of terminal conditions will not ensure a stable solution.
There still remains the problem of how the terminal conditions are actually cho­
sen. A number of proposals have been made. One particular proposal which is used 
in this study is that the terminal conditions should be set at the ecpiilibrium solution 
(steady state) of the model. The justification for this is that nonconvergent behavior 
would provide a response on the part of economic agents who would then respond 
so as to eliminate the non-convergence. One of the difficulties of using the equi­
librium solution of the model as terminal conditions is the problem of determining 
it, especially when the model is large and non-linear. The extent to which the as­
sumed terminal conditions corrupt the solution will depend both upon the stability 
(eigenvalues of the roots) and upon the size T.
3.4.3 Handling Constraints
In our model, we have linear constraints both as equalities (capital accumulation 
equation) and as inequalities (non-negativity constraints, C f  >  0 and C f  >  0 for 
all t). The equalities are eliminated at the start by substitution. Thus, we first 
substituted equation (14) into (12) for each region. North and South, and then, the 
inequalities are handled by penalty functions. The constrained problem is trans­
formed to an unconstrained problem by associating a penalty with all constraint 
violations and the penalties are included in the evaluation function. The penalty 
term will be an arbitrary negative big number such as —10*^ since we are solving 
a maximization problem. Thus, if consumptions at time t are negative, the utility 
at that period becomes —10®C'*(i) ,^ i — Af^S. Hence, the terms of trade and in­
vestment plans which make objective functions negative are immediately disregarded 
from the search space. In this study, we are using GA algorithm as a solution tech­
nique, we ignored the various new approaches to solve numeric optimization problems 
with linear constraints based on GA (Michalewicz and Janikow 1991) but rather used 
penalty functions in accordance with the general knowledge.
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3.4.4 Simulation Results
For numerical analysis, we adopt the following particular functional forms:
£L
[/(Cl) =  '
log Cl for cr =  1
for cr >  0, cr ^  0 i =  Ai, S
and
d W
D{Vt) =  - ^  d > 0  
I K *
where d converts pollution to disutility. Also,
Yt =  a K^ R f , a +  ^ < 1 and a > 0
All uncounted inputs u were normalized to one for simplicity.
The following set of parameter values are assumed:
a =  0.80 /? =  0.15 7 =  2 a =  l 6 =  1 d = l e  — 5
(7 =  1.50 <5 =  0.08 pj  ^ =  0.02 ps =  0.02 a; =  0.50 <^ =  0.15
These parameter values are assumed for the purposes of illustration, nevertheless 
they are not totally unjustified. Similar values of a, cr, 6, pi and a are used by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) in a different context, d is so chosen to conform 
with the assumed utility function, (j) parameterizes the importance of the effetcs of 
knowledge spillovers in the North/South trade game. To highlight the significance 
of knowledge spillover, we run the experiment with (f> =  0.30 as well. 7 , and 6 are 
chosen to satisfy parameter restrictions and are inconsequential to our arguments 
about knowledge spillovers^ .^
In the time-aggregate model, we assume 21 periods (M =20) with a dense equally 
spaced gridding of the time horizon T (t(M)  =200) which is also quite sufficient to 
capture the convergence over time.
^^The genetic operators in this paper were done using the public domain GENESIS package (Grefenstette, 1990) 
on a SUN SPAC-1000 running Solaris 2.4. A typiccd run uses population size, j 50, runs 15 million generations for 
noncooperative game and 30 million generations for cooperative cases, crossover rate is 0.60 and mutation rate is 
0.03. None of the results depends on the values of genetic operators other than run time by the choice of number 
of generations. For each parameter set, we have to implement three separate GAs. Hence, we are limited by the 
increased computational costs in our scope for a complete sensitivity analysis.
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As mentioned earlier, we simultaneously run two separate genetic programs, GA^  
and GA^ ^ to solve the noncooperative game. G A^  generates a population of candi­
date solutions (chromosomes) K{i )  representing the Northern accumulated knowl­
edge. The population of chromosomes p{t) denotes theset of Southern price strategies 
and is produced by GA^.  Structures, Kj ,  pj in each population {j =  1, 2, ...,50) are 
represented as a binary string ({0 1})  of length 1. For string j  of length /(=  10), 
decoding works as follows:
Kii t )  =  ¿  Pi(t) = ¿
h.=l h=l
where a*(i)is the value {0 1} taken at the /ith position in the string. After strings 
are decoded, integers are normalized in order to obtain a real number value.
Since Ko is given while po is free, in every iteration (generation), G A ^  computes 
M  and GA^ M  -f- 1 structures each with a domain, Z),· =  [d, d] C 3?; i =  p, K . Di is 
cut into (d —d)2^° equal size ranges. Thus the noncooperative game has the minimal 
search domain of 2'*^ ° =  2.64423e -|- 123.
Cooperative solutions are computationally much more complex than noncooper­
ative ones. In the latter case, the search for the optimum consists of two one­
dimensional problems, while the former represents one two-dimensional problem. In 
the cooperative experiment, three chromosomes, pt,Kt and Rt, (62 structure) are 
searched in the minimal domain of 2®^ °.
Regional decisions are updated using genetic operators, selection, crossover, and 
mutation. The selection strategy is elitist so that the best performing strategy in the 
population of survivors is kept. This selection rule is a natural candidate in noncoop­
erative Nash games. Therefore, it is especially crucial for the dynamic noncooperative 
game as it requires best responses be mutually exchanged. Were it not for the elitist 
selection, the best structures may disappear making for a nonconvergence.
The termination conditions are specified beforehand as certain number of itera­
tions. We gradually increase the number of iterations until no further improvements 
are observed.
Tables 1 to 4 and Figures 1 to 3 summarize our numerical findings based on the 
assumed parameter values.
First, we note that as knowledge spills over more freely, the optimal long-run 
resource/capital ratio rises. This is so, since higher knowledge spillover lowers the
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long-run pollution cost thereby reducing the supply price and making increased use 
of resources for any given level of knowledge optimal.
Secondly, the higher degree of knowledge diffusion increases stationary capital 
stock and lowers the long-run pollution level irrespective of the mode of behavior. 
As we note above with higher <^ , R jK  rises. The marginal reduction in pollution 
due to higher K  outweighs the incremental increase in pollution because of higher R 
so that the overall long-run pollution falls.
Figure 3 compares some results from the cooperative behavior with (f> =  0.15 
and the noncooperative model with (j) =  0.30. Clearly, dissemination of knowledge 
strongly influences the long-run behavior. The cost of setting up institutions to 
monitor and enforce the international cooperation may be prohibitive. To the extent 
that knowledge diffusion can be enhanced at relatively less cost, regions may opt to 
cooperate on sharing of information. This indicates that even if the parties may fail, 
say due to enforcement problems, to realize the first best solution, they may still 
achieve significant improvement in welfare by strengthening the knowledge flow from 
North to South which lowers the cost of pollution to the South thereby lowering the 
supply price of the resources:
Total discounted welfares of each region under different mode of behavior
Rate of 
Diffusion {(j))
North South
Noncooperative Cooperative Noncooperative Cooperative
0.15 -0.058138 -0.054725 -0.072729 -0.065882
0.30 -0.047346 -0.045009 -0.060418 -0.054318
Both regions’ welfares improve with the sufficient dissemination of knowledge.
From Figures 1 and 2, though cooperation yields significant increases in the levels 
of long-run knowledge stock and resource use, the optimal resource/knowledge mix 
is almost the same under both regimes. This is so because the long-run resource 
prices are almost the same. Also, notice that cooperation results in a higher long- 
run pollution level. Included in the noncooperative resource price is a monopoly 
rent which restricts growth and resource use. Consequently, the resulting level of 
pollution is less than what is warranted by a global welfare.
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Kt Pt Rt Vi C f
Table 1: The result of the noncooperative game with diffusion rate of 15 percent
O f Rt/Kt Vt/Kt
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11 
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1000000.000
1120234.604
1234604.106
1340175.953
1436950.147
1524926.686
1604105.572
1674486.804
1739002.933
1794721.408
1841642.229
1882697.947
1917888.563
1947214.076
1973607.038
1994134.897
2011730.205
2029325.513
2043988.270
2055718.475
2064516.129
77.967
86.442
94.252
101.564
108.045
114.027
119.345
124.164
128.485
132.141
135.298
137.957
140.283
142.278
143.939
145.269
146.432
147.595
148.592
149.423
149.922
283.125
279.039
276.186
273.253
271.306
269.286
267.680
266.037
264.800
263.921
263.001
262.438
261.849
261.241
260.983
260.702
260.411
260.122
259.824
259.519
259.545
5045.758
4818.407 
4652.048 
4498.064 
4388.060 
4284.599 
4201.621 
4123.555 
4062.196 
4016.228 
3972.867 
3942.815 
3914.248 
3887.233
3871.732
3857.408
3843.733 
3830.200 
3817.304 
3805.080 
3803.405
33064.556
35627.665
38184.480
40373.921
42354.554
44088.316
45662.203
46772.060
48103.356
49353.218
50203.064
51027.299
51790.614
52206.763
52931.005
53316.818
53386.591
53746.547
54085.868
54405.853
55337.091
22074.356
24120.597
26031.175
27752.721
29313.215
30705.942
31946.254
33032.227
34022.724
34874.649
35583.532
36205.093
36733.103
37168.797
37565.710
37871.848
38132.566
38392.741
38607.874
38778.193
38911.488
0.000283
0.000249
0.000224
0.000204
0.000189
0.000177
0.000167
0.000159
0.000152
0.000147
0.000143
0.000139
0.000137
0.000134
0.000132
0.000131
0.000129
0.000128
0.000127
0.000126
0.000126
0.005046
0.004301
0.003768
0.003356
0.003054
0.002810
0.002619
0.002463
0.002336
0.002238
0..002157
0.002094
0.002041
0.001996
0.001962
0.001934
0.001911
0.001887
0.001868
0.001851
0.001842
Table 2: The result of the cooperative game with diffusion rate of 15 percent
t Kt Pt Rt Vt c f c f Rt/Kt Vt/Kt
0 1000000.000 51.818 598.651 22558.876 31053.778 31021.008 0.000599 0.022559
1 1225806.448 60.909 586.921 21031.282 35933.968 35748.814 0.000479 0.017157
2 1460410.552 69.853 584.233 20298.802 40712.731 40810.621 0.000400 0.013899
3 1697947.216 79.384 574.457 19186.562 45916.300 45602.827 0.000338 0.011300
4 1923753.664 87.889 571.281 18622.863 50150.338 50209.026 0.000297 0.009680
5 2140762.468 96.979 564.927 17921.275 54982.562 54786.292 0.000264 0.008371
6 2331378.304 106.657 550.020 16771.980 57228.799 58663.375 0.000236 0.007194
7 2507331.376 112.815 548.553 16501.593 61906.551 61885.174 0.000219 0.006581
8 2653958.944 117.361 543.666 16071.253 64431.200 63804.988 0.000205 0.006056
9 2791788.856 123.079 541.711 15835.157 66743.358 66673.302 0.000194 0.005672
10 2912023.456 126.745 542.199 15763.725 69246.953 68720.993 0.000186 0.005413
11 3017595.304 132.023 540.733 15595.052 70757.598 71389.460 0.000179 0.005168
12 3105571.852 135.689 542.444 15626.375 72579.693 73603.737 0.000175 0.005032
13 3175953.076 138.622 541.711 15531.866 74402.654 75092.852 0.000171 0.004890
14 3228739.000 139.648 542.688 15549.477 75613.083 75785.369 0.000168 0.004816
15 3275659.828 143.460 542.199 15487.926 76374.164 77784.150 0.000166 0.004728
16 3304985.332 143.607 541.222 15411.513 78440.272 77723.273 0.000164 0.004663
17 3319648.096 143.607 540.000 15331.820 74690.809 77547.801 0.000163 0.004619
18 3375366.568 145.806 541.711 15390.638 77901.150 78984.908 0.000160 0.004560
19 3398826.976 137.302 547.087 15681.350 76759.806 75116.168 0.000161 0.004614
20 3483870.964 148.739 540.000 15221.176 81028.038 80319.062 0.000155 0.004369
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Table 3: The result of the noncooperative game with diffusion rate of 30 percent
Kt Pt Rt Vt Cf C f Rt/Kt Vt/Kt
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11 
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1000000.000
1249266.862
1506842.620
1764418.377
2021994.135
2279569.892
2520527.859
2744868.035
2952590.420
3143695.015
3318181.818
3476050.831
3617302.053
3750244.379
3866568.915
3957966.764
4041055.718
4115835.777
4173998.045
4223851.417
4265395.894
33.343
40.205
47.067
53.803
60.283
66.637
72.610
77.947
82.903
87.478
91.417
95.103
98.280
101.329
103.998
106.031
108.192
109.589
110.860
112.004
113.021
769.100 
760.908 
754.121 
747.500
743.355 
739.617 
734.888 
732.542 
729.719 
726.686 
725.973 
723.980 
723.134 
721.700 
720.379
719.810
716.810
718.356
718.100 
717.454 
716.437
4687.433
4291.783
3985.032
3734.328
3545.101
3385.541
3243.138
3141.080
3049.443
2967.777
2914.347
2858.231
2817.681
2776.297
2740.904
2717.463
2678.120
2674.931
2661.795
2647.559
2632.319
40390.275
47658.693
54830.827
60987.681
66417.730
72826.629
78298.376
83202.928
87493.390
91280.228
94835.891
97954.462
100047.483
102748.345
106069.849
107546.961
108703.692
111021.151
112211.082
113297.510
117610.283
25644.170
30592.521
35494.555
40217.422
44812.030 
49286.121 
53360.227 
57099.637 
60496.074
63569.031 
66366.589 
68852.409 
71069.273 
73129.473 
74917.967 
76322.329 
77552.851 
78724.278 
79608.752 
80357.660 
80972.110
0.000769
0.000609
0.000500
0.000424
0.000368
0.000324
0.000292
0.000267
0.000247
0.000231
0.000219
0.000208
0.000200
0.000192
0.000186
0.000182
0.000177
0.000175
0.000172
0.000170
0.000168
0.004687
0.003435
0.002645
0.002116
0.001753
0.001485
0.001287
0.001144
0.001033
0.000944
0.000878
0.000822
0.000779
0.000740
0.000709
0.000687
0.000663
0.000650
0.000638
0.000627
0.000617
Table 4: The results of the cooperative game with diffusion rate of 30 percent
t Kt Pt Rt Vt c f c f Tit/Kt VtiKt
0 1000000.000 23.072 1597.290 20217.970 37433.968 36852.467 0.001597 0.020218
1 1364824.609 29.335 1591.687 18287.835 46345.522 46692.902 0.001166 0.013399
2 1787925.607 35.152 1608.048 17213.262 56806.064 56525.621 0.000899 0.009628
3 2263924.062 42.422 1591.687 15711.831 67700.291 67522.498 0.000703 0.006940
4 2766351.580 48.686 1593.480 14828.288 77747.379 77579.514 0.000576 0.005360
5 3304057.180 54.726 1604.014 14245.315 87214.859 87780.484 0.000485 0.004311
6 3877001.532 61.548 1604.462 13585.639 99967.284 98752.037 0.000414 0.003504
7 4432326.508 66.582 1627.547 13429.120 108431.263 108364.748 0.000367 0.003030
8 5014080.547 73.964 1618.358 12795.634 117888.573 119699.843 0.000323 0.002552
9 5569405.523 79.109 1615.893 12360.970 126898.505 127831.485 0.000290 0.002219
10 6115920.811 85.820 1611.634 11955.405 140779.303 138310.269 0.000264 0.001955
11 6565450.873 91.524 1602.221 11567.393 146735.396 146642.091 0.000244 0.001762
12 6979742.183 98.123 1591.015 11198.678 152487.541 156115.849 0.000228 0.001604
13 7332326.348 101.815 1572.188 10774.731 159340.646 160071.535 0.000214 0.001469
14 7640822.743 102.933 1595.273 10957.160 164925.320 164206.236 0.000209 0.001434
15 7940548.78 108.190 1586.308 10710.010 169193.976 171622.663 0.000200 0.001349
16 8178528.343 109.532 1581.602 10552.658 178158.237 173236.347 0.000193 0.001290
17 8354800.761 108.637 1622.392 11033.182 173812.724 176252.449 0.000194 0.001321
18 8619248.717 115.125 1595.049 10565.188 184793.166 183629.538 0.000185 0.001226
19 8725043.631 117.585 1581.378 10346.920 186627.283 185946.965 0.000181 0.001186
20 8795560.464 120.270 1561.206 10060.310 191094.069 187765.933 0.000177 0.001144
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Figure 2: The figures related to diffusion rate of 30 percent. Solid lines are used 
to denote noncooperative optimal strategies.
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Figure 3: Solid lines denote result of noncooperative game with rate of diffusion of 
30 percent and dashed lines denote result of cooperative game with rate of diffusion 
of 15 percent.
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As far as the transition paths are concerned, the most striking difference is that 
along the noncooperative path, resource prices are initial!}  ^ too high and therefore 
the rate of investment is too low relative to the cooperative case. Moreover, the 
transition to the stationary equilibrium is more rapid along the cooperative path. 
The resource price starts lower but ultimately catches up with the noncooperative 
resource price.
In the noncooperative mode the shadow value (the marginal benefit) of the knowl­
edge stock differs for the two regions as the regions have diflPerent preferences (fit­
nesses) leading to conflicting policies and harmful “policy externalities.'' Moreover, 
when policies are chosen with a view to maximize own fitness taking the rival's as 
given, the “ incentive” effects of the policies are ignored. The South chooses resource 
prices for any “given investment policy” of the North, thus ignoring the fact that 
a lower price today (lower consumption) ma,y “induce” the North to invest more 
today which then leads to higher prices (higher Southern consumption) as the higher 
knowledge stock shifts the demand for resources tomorrow. The North on the other 
hand, ignores the fact that, an initially higher investment profile (lower consump­
tion) may induce South to ask for lower resource prices today in return for higher 
prices tomorrow (as the demand for resources will shift) and also to higher Northern 
consumption in the future as the amount to be invested will be lower in the future 
(higher Northern consumption). Parties ignore the incentive eifect for the fact that 
promises are not credible. If South were to offer prices along the cooperative path, 
it is not optimal for the North to invest as much as promised along the cooperative 
path. North will consume more and invest less. Likewise if North commits itself to 
the investment plan along the cooperative path, then it will not be optimal for the 
South to ask for prices along the cooperative path. South will ask higher prices and 
consume more. Hence, parties will employ Nash strategies to maximize respective 
fitnesses. Note that these effects are independent of the presence of monopoly power 
and the pollution and knowledge externalities, but obviously will further compound 
the ineffiencies that stem from them.
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3.5 Conclusion
A genetic algorithm is introduced to search for optimal policies in the presence of 
knowledge spillover and local pollution in a dynamic North/South trade game. Non- 
cooperative trade compounds inefficiencies stemming from externalities. Competitive 
resource production in the South would overpollute whereas “local” internalization 
of pollution together with resource monopoly limit growth and trade and result in 
underpollution.
Because of the spillovers, the stock of knowledge is partially a common prop­
erty (Grossman and Helpman 1991). For the fact that benefits from investment in 
knowledge can not be totally captured by the North, there is underinvestment. In 
the presence of knowledge spillovers, there is an added incentive on the part of the 
North to cooperate as the benefit from knowledge spillovers are internalized in the 
form of reduced waste which is then reflected to the North as initial lower resource 
prices.
Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet not credible. Nonetheless, even if 
parties trade noncooperatively, dynamic gains still materialize if the South’s access 
to the North’s stock of accumulated knowledge is enhanced. Short of a joint maxi­
mization of the global welfare, transfer of knowledge remains as the viable route to 
improve global welfare.
82
Appendix
A .l .  First Order Condition for Noncooperative Game:
We begin by looking at the North’s problem. The current value Hamiltonian is
=  U{C^)  +  i i M [ F { K , R ) - p R - 5 K - C ^ ]
where pj^ is the costate variable for the North associated with the capital accumula­
tion equation (2). pj f^ may be interpreted as the shadow value of a marginal increase 
in the capital accumulation of all kinds. The standard optimal control procedure 
yields the following first order necessary conditions: 
dH dU
d c ^
dH
dR
dH
~d l<
dC ^
-  Pat =  0
=  patIRr -  p] =  0 
=  PAT =  PAi[pAT +  S -  F k ]
(0
(ii)
(in)
and equation (2) as well as the usual transversality condition. F{ denotes dF/di.
Equation (i) gives us the usual consumption smoothing condition that the imputed 
price of consumption at each period equals to its marginal utility, (ii) implies that 
resource is demanded upto its marginal benefit of resource (marginal productivity) 
equals its marginal cost (price of the resource) and equation (iii) implies that the 
rate of growth in the imputed price of investment indicating capital gains is equal to 
the difference between marginal productivity of capital and the marginal cost of the 
capital, p/j- +  8.
A similar method applies to the South’s maximization problem where p is the 
control variable, ps is the costate variable and K  is the state variable
=  U [ C ( p , R ) ) - V [ V ( R ( p ) , K ) )
+ps\F(K,R(p))  -  pR{p) -  SK -  C*']
and the first order conditions are:
dH
dp
dU dC^ dU dC^ dR
dp
pollution
externality
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dH
dK
, , d F d R  „  dR, ^
=  fj-s
dU dV
knowledge
externality
+/^5[/35 +   ^— Fk ]
(iv)
(v)
P
and equation (2) and the usual transversality condition. The equation (iv) is rear­
ranged and written as
dUdVi  ro r.
d V d R \ ~ ^ ^ ^
where the first term is the marginal benefit of price increase on the consumption and 
utility of the South and the term before the bracket is the price elasticity of resource 
and inside the bracket net welfare benefit of resource sales (utility minus disutility). 
This equation says that the net welfare benefit from price changes (directlty or indi­
rectly through resource demand changes) equals to the shadow price of an increase 
in investment in the North times the difference between resource demanded and the 
net benefit of resource bought by the North. The interpretation of eq. (v) is different 
than the eq. (iii) since there is the term of knowledge externality. Thus, marginal 
valuation of Norht’s investment in the South includes the welfare effect of knowl­
edge spillover as well. To solve such problems with traditional methods, we have to 
construct the state space representation of these F. 0. C. ’s and solve the model for 
Kt,pt, C f ,  p r^ and ps-
First Order Condition for Cooperative Game:
Now, let’s define the current Hamiltonian as
=  uU {C '') +  ( l - ^ ) [ U ( C ^ ( p , R ) ) - U ( V ) ]
+p[F{K,  R, u ) - p R -  8K -  C^]
The necessary conditions for maximum are:
dH
=  u
dU
— p — 0
dC^
dH , , dU dC^ ^ „
=  (1 - ^ ) ^ — - ^ ^  =  0
( m )
{vii)
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dH
dR
dH
d K
=  ( l - u ; ) [
dU dC^ dUdV,
dV dn}  -  P] -  0 {viii)
pollution 
externality
r , r r. n ^dU dV=  y - - t i [ p  +  S - F K ]  +  { l - o j ) {ix)
knowledge externality
and equation (2) and the transversality conditions. The equations (vi) and (vii) 
might be written as the ratio
dU jdC ^  ( l - o ; )
udUldC^
which says that the ratio of the marginal utilities of the North’s consumption to the 
South’s consumption is equal to the ratio of the cooperative agreements (weights). 
Finally, if we rearrange eq. (viii)
(1 -u ; )
UJ
=  Fr - p
- UqM UqN
it gives weighted marginal net utility (utility minus disutility) of resource usage on 
South normalized to the marginal benefit of this on consumption of North equals 
the difference between marginal productivity of resource and price of that resource. 
Finally equation (ix) is interpreted as the rate of growth in the imputed price of the 
investment indicating capital gain which is now difference between marginal benefit 
and marginal cost of capital plus positive effect of knowledge spillover on the growth 
of capital gains
Thus, as long as appropriate simplifications on functional forms, we can solve the 
simulatenous systems of equations i?,/t', p, (7· ,^ and p.
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A .2.1. C codes o f the main program for the noncooperative game between North and 
South
North:
#include "extem .h "
#include "sem op.h "
#define S H M K E Y .P  ((key_t) 2890) 
#define SH M K E Y _S ((key_t) 2891) 
#define SE M K E Y l ((key_t) 3893) 
#define SEM KEY2 ((key_t) 3894) 
#define SEM KEY3 ((key_t) 3895)
#define N O R T H  1
#define T M A X  21 
#define (double)A  1 
#define (double)B 0.15  
#define (double)D  0.0000001  
#define (double)A L P H A  0.80  
#define (d o u b le )G A M M A  0.15  
#define (double)R H O N  0.02  
#define (double)R H O S 0.02  
#define (double)SIG M A 1.5 
#define (double)D ELTA 0.08  
#define (double)KO 1000000.0  
typedef double M esg[T M A X ];
int shm id;
int shm sem ,syncsem l,syncsem 2; 
M esg  *p;
M esg  *s;
getsharedO
{
if((shm id=shm get(SH M K EY_P,sizeof(M esg),06661 IPC_CREAT))<0)
I
printf("server can't get shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
1
if((p=(M esg *) shm at(shm id,(char*)0,0)) = =  (M esg *) -1)
{
printf("server can't attach shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
1
if((shm id=shm get(SH M K EY_S,sizeof(M esg),06661 IPC_CR EAT))<0)
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printf("server can't get shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
}
if((s=(M esg *) shmat(shmid,(char*)0,0)) = =  (M esg *) -1)
{
printf("server can't attach shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
}
relsharedO
I
if(shm dt(p)<0)
printf("server can't detach shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
if(shm dt(s)<0)
printf ("server can't detach shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
)
sem _signal(syncsem l);
sem _signal(syncsem 2); 
sem _close(s3m csem l); 
sem _close(syncsem 2); 
sem _close (shm sem ); * /
}
initsharedO
{
#if N O R T H
if ( (syncsem l = sem _create(SEM KEYl, 0)) < 0)
err_sys("north: can't create sync sem aphore");
if ( (syncsem 2 = sem_create(SEM KEY3, 0)) < 0)
err_sys("north: can't create sync sem aphore");
#else
#endif
if ( (shm sem  = sem _create(SEM K E Y2,1)) < 0)
err_sys("north: can't create shm  sem aphore");
if ( (syncsem l = sem _open(SEM K EYl)) < 0)
err_sys("south: can't create sync sem aphore");
if ( (syncsem 2 = sem _open(SEM KEY3)) < 0)
err_sys("south: can't create sync semaphore") 
if ( (shm sem  = sem _open(SEM KEY2)) < 0)
err_sys("south: can't create shm sem aphore");
sem _w ait(shm sem );
U npack(N ew [0].G ene, Bitstring, Length); 
if (Floatflag)
FloatRep(Bitstring, Vector, Genes);
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#if N O R T H
#else
#endif
m em cpy(s,Vector,sizeof(double)’^ TMAX);
m em cpy(p,Vector,sizeof(double)’^ TMAX);
sem _signal(shm sem ); 
synchronizeO;
}
synchronizeO
{
#if N O R T H
sem _signal(syncsem l); 
sem _w ait(syncsem 2);
#else
sem _signal(syncsem 2); 
sem _w ait(syncsem l);
#endif
movebesttosharedO
sem _w ait(shm sem );
Unpack(New[Best_giJiy]-Gene, Bitstring, Length); 
if (Floatflag)
#if N O R T H  
#else 
#endif
}
sem _signal(shm sem );
FloatRep(Bitstring, Vector, Genes);
m em cpy(s,Vector,sizeof(double)’^ TMAX);
m em cpy(p,Vector,sizeof(double)’*^TMAX);
double eval(str, length, vect, genes) 
char str[]; string representation
int length; length o f bit string
double vect[]; floating point representation
int genes; / *  num ber o f elements in vect
V
V
V
V
register int t; 
double ans=0; 
double k [T M A X ]; 
double n [T M A X ]; 
double r[T M A X ]; 
double y [T M A X ]; 
double c[T M A X ]; 
double rhocoef=l; 
double interv=10; 
static unsigned char first = 1;
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if (first)
{
c l= p o w (A , (1 /(1 G A M M A )))  * p o w (G A M M A X G A M M A /(l-G A M M A ));
c 2 = A L P H A /( l -G A M M A );
c 3 = -G A M M A /( l -G A M M A ) ;
first=0;
)
sem _w ait(shm sem );
for (t =  0; t < (T M A X -1 ); t++)
{
if(t= = 0 )
{
k[0]=K 0;
y[t]=cl*pow ((*p)[t],c3)*pow (k[t],c2);
r [t]= (G A M M A /(»p )[t])»y [t];
c[t]=y[t]-(Cp)[t]»r[t])-(k[t]»D ELTA)-((double)(l/m terv)*(vect[t]-k[t]));
if(c [t]<0)
ans+=-100000000*c[t]»c[t];
else
ans+=rhocoef*interv*(pow (c[t],(l-SIG M A ))/(1-SIG M A ));
)
else
{
k[t]=vect[t-lj;
y[t]=cl*pow ((*p)[t],c3)*pow (k[t],c2);
r [t]= (G A M M A /(»p )[t])*y [t];
c[t]=y[t]-((*p)[t]*r[t])-(k[t]*D ELTA)-((double)(l/m terv)*(vect[t]-k[t]));
if(c[t]<0)
ans+=-100000000*c[t]»c[t];
else
I
rhocoef*=(d ou ble)(l/(l+ (m terv*(dou ble)R H O N ))); 
ans+=rhocoef*interv*(pow (c[t],(l-SIG M A)) /  (1-SIG M A));
}
}
1
k[t]=vect[t-l];
y[t]=cl*pow ((*p)[t],c3)*pow (k[t],c2);
r[t]=((d ou b le)G A M M A /(*p )[t])»y[t];
c[t]-y[t]-(*p)[t]*r[t]-(k[t]*D ELTA);
if(c[t]<0)
ans+=-100000000'^c[t]»c[t];
else
1
a n s+ = (rh o co e f/R H O N )»(p o w (c[t],(l-S IG M A ))/(l-S lG M A ));
}
sem _signal(shm sem );
return(airs);
static double cl,c2,c3;
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South:
#include "extem .h "
#include "sem op .h "
#define S H M K E Y _P  ((key_t) 2890)
#define SH M K E Y _S  ((key_t) 2891)
#define SE M K E Y l ((key_t) 3893)
#define SEM K EY2 ((key_t) 3894)
#define SEM K EY3 ((key_t) 3895)
# d e fin e T M A X  21 
#define (double)A  1 
#define (double)B 0.15  
#define (double)D  0.0000001  
#define (double)A L P H A  0.80  
#define (d o u b le )G A M M A  0.15  
#define (d ouble)R H O N  0.02  
#define (double)R H O S 0.02  
#define (double)SIG M A  1.5 
#define (double)D ELTA 0.08  
#define (double)KO 1000000.0  
typedef double M esg[T M A X ];
int shm id;
int shm sem ,syncsem l,syncsem 2;
M esg *p;
M esg *s;
getsharedO
I
if((shm id=shm get(SH M K EY_P,sizeof(M esg),06661 IPC_CREAT))<0)
{
printf("server can't get shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
1
if((p=(M esg *) shmat(shmid,(char*)0,0)) = =  (M esg *) -1)
I
printf("server can't attach shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
1
if((shm id=shm get(SH M K EY_S,sizeof(M esg),06661 IPC_CREAT))<0)
(
printf("server can't get shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
1
if((s=(M esg *) shmat(shmid,(char*)0,0)) = =  (M esg *) -1)
I
printfC’server can't attach shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
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relsharedO
I
if(shm dt(p)<0)
{
printf("server can't detach shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
}
if(shm dt(s)<0)
I
printf("server can't detach shared m em ory"); 
exit(l);
}
sem _signal(syncsem l);
sem _signal(syncsem 2);
sem _close(syncsem l);
sem _cIose(syncsem 2);
sem _close(shm sem );’*·/
initsharedO
#if N O R T H
if ( (syncsem l = sem _create(SEM KEYl, 0)) < 0)
err_sys("north: can't create sync sem aphore");
if ( (syncsem 2 = sem _create(SEM KEY3,0)) < 0)
err_sys("north: can't create sync sem aphore");
if ( (shm sem  = sem _create(SEM K EY2,1)) < 0)
err_sys("north: can't create shm sem aphore");
#else
#endif
if ( (syncsem l = sem _open(SEM K EYl)) < 0)
err_sys("south: can't create sync sem aphore");
if ( (syncsem 2 = sem _open(SEM KEY3)) < 0)
err_sys("south: can't create sync sem aphore");
if ( (shm sem  = sem _open(SEM KEY2)) < 0)
err_sys("south: can't create shm sem aphore");
sem _w ait (shm sem );
U npack(N ew [0].G ene, Bitstring, Length); 
if (Floatflag)
#if N O R T H
FloatRep(Bitstring, Vector, Genes); 
m em cpy(s,Vector,sizeof(double)*TM AX);
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#else
#endif
m em cpy(p,Vector,sizeof(double)*TM AX);
sem _signal(shm sem ); 
synchronizeO;
synchronizeO
{
int sem val;
#if N O R T H
sem _signal(syncsem l);
sem _w ait(syncsem 2);
#else
sem _signal(syncsem 2); 
sem _w ait(syncsem l);
#endif
/*se m v a l =  sem ctl(shm sem , 0, G E TV AL, 0); 
printf("% d ",sem val);
sem val =  sem ctl(syncsem l, 0, G ETVAL, 0); 
printf(”% d  ",sem val);
sem val = sem ctl(syncsem 2, 0, G E TV AL, 0);
printf(”% d  ",sem val);
printf("\n”) ;* /
movebesttosharedO
sem _w ait(shm sem );
Unpack(N ew [Best_guy].G ene, Bitstring, Length); 
if (Floatflag)
#if N O R T H  
#else 
#endif
}
sem _signal(shm sem );
FloatRep(Bitstring, Vector, Genes);
m em cpy(s,Vector,sizeof(double)’*'TMAX);
mem cpy(p,Vector,sizeof(double)'^TM AX);
double eval(str, length, vect, genes) 
char str[]; / ’*■ string representation 
int length; / ’*■ length of bit string 
double vect[]; / ’*' floating point representation 
int genes; / ’*’ num ber of elements in vect
V
V
V
V
register int t; 
double ans=0;
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double k [T M A X ]; 
double y [T M A X ]; 
double n [T M A X ]; 
double r[T M A X ]; 
double c[T M A X ]; 
double u [T M A X ]; 
double rh ocoef=l; 
double in tervl=10; 
static unsigned char first = 1; 
static double cl,c2 ,c3;
if (first)
I
c l= p o w (A ,(d o u b le )(l/(l-G A M M A )))*p o w (G A M M A ,(d o u b le )(G A M M A /(l-G A M M A ))) ;
c 2 = A L P H A /( l-G A M M A );
c 3 = -G A M M A /( l -G A M M A ) ;
first=0;
}
sem _w ait(shm sem );
for (t =  0; t <  (T M A X -1 ); t++)
I
if(t==0)
{
k[0]=K 0;
y[t]=cl*pow(vect[t],c3)*pow(k[t],c2);
r[t]=((double)G A M M A /vect[t])*y[t];
u[t]=r[t]*r[t]*0.5*D*pow(k[t],(double)(-B));
c[t]=(pow(vect[t]*r[t],(l-SlGMA)))/(l-SIGMA);
ans+=rhocoef*interv*(c[t]-u[t]);
}
else
{
k[t]=C^s)[t-l];
y[t]=cl*pow(vect[t],c3)*pow(k[t],c2); 
r[t]=((double)G AM M A/vect[t])'^y[t]; 
u[t]=r[t]*r[t]»0.5*D*pow(k[t],(double)(-B)); 
c[t]=(pow (vect[t]*r[t],(l-SIG M A )))/(1-S lG M A ); 
rhocoef*=(double)(l /  (l+interv*(double)RHOS)); 
ans+=rhocoef*interv*(c[t]-u[t]);
k[t]=(>^s)[t-l];
y[t]=cl*pow (vect[t],c3)*pow (k[t],c2);
r[t]=((double)G A M M A /vect[t])*y[t];
uIt]=r[t]*r[t]’^ 0.5*D*pow(k[t],(double)(-B));
c[t]=(p ow (vect[t]*r[t],(l-S lG M A )))/(1-SlG M A );
ans+=(rhocoef/((double)RH OS))*(c[t]-u[t]);
sem _signal(shm sem );
return(ans);)
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A .2.2 C  codes of the main program for the cooperative game
#include "extem .h " 
#include "m ath .h "
#define N O R T H  1
# d e fin e T M A X  21 
#define (double)A  1
#define (double)D  0.0000001
#define (d ouble)A L P H A  0.80  
#define (d o u b le )G A M M A  0.15  
#define (double)BETA 0.30  
#define (double)R H O N  0.02  
#defm e (double)R H O S 0.02  
#define (double)SIG M A 1.5 
#define (double)D ELTA 0.08  
#define (double)KO 1000000.0
double eval(str, length, vect, genes) 
char str[]; / *  string representation 
int length; / *  length of bit string 
double vect[]; / *  floating point representation 
int genes; / *  num ber of elements in vect
V
V
V
V
register int t; 
double ans=0; 
double k [T M A X ]; 
double y[TM AXJ; 
double d [T M A X ]; 
double c[T M A X ]; 
double u [T M A X ]; 
double h [T M A X ]; 
double m [T M A X ]; 
double v [T M A X ]; 
double rh ocoefn ^l; 
double in tervl=10; 
static unsigned char first = 1;
for (t -  0; t <  (T M A X -1); t++)
{
if(t= = 0 )
1
k [0 ]-K 0 ;
m [t]=vect[t+20]*vect[t+41];
y[t]=A *pow (vect[t+20],G A M M A )*pow (k[t],A LP H A );
d[t]=(.5*D V ect[t+20]*vect[t+20])/pow (k[t],B ET A);
c[t]=y[t]-(k[t]*D E LT A )-m [t]-((double)(l/intervl)’^ (vect[t]-g[t]));
u [t]=(p ow (c[t],(d ou b le)(l-S IG M A )))/(l-S IG M A );
94
v [t]= (p o w (m [t],(d ou b le )(l-S IG M A )))/(l-S IG M A );
if(c [t]<0)
ans+=-100000000*c[t]*c[t];
else
ans+=rhocoefh*intervl*((u[t]+v[t])-d[t]);
1
else
{
k[t]=vect[t-l];
m [t]=vect[t+20]*vect[t+41];
y [t]=A *pow (vect[t+20],G A M M A )*pow (k[t],A L P H A );
d[t]=(.5*D »vect[t+20]V ect[t+20])/pow (k[t],B E T A );
c[t]=y[t]-(k[t]*D E LTA)-m [t]-((double)(l/intervl)*(vect[t]-g[t]));
u [t]= (p o w (c[t],(d ou b le )(l-S IG M A )))/(l-S IG M A );
v [t]= (p o w (m [t],(d ou b le )(l-S IG M A )))/(l-S lG M A );
if(c [t]<0)
ans+=-100000000*c[t]*c[t];
else
I
rhocoe£n*=(double)(l/(l+(intervl*(double)R H O N )));
ans+=rhocoefn*intervl*((u[t]+v[t])-d[t]);
k [t]=vect[t-l];
m [t]=vect[t+20]*vect[t+41];
y[t]=(double)A *pow (vect[t+20],(double)G A M M A )*pow (k[t],(double)A L P H A );
d[t]=(.5*(double)D *vect[t+20]*vect[t+20])/pow (k[t],(double)BETA);
c[t]=y[t]-(k[t]*DELTA)-m [t];
u [t]= (p ow (c[t],(d ou b le )(l-S IG M A )))/(l-S IG M A );
v [t]= (p o w (m [t],(d ou b le )(l-S IG M A )))/(l-S IG M A );
if(c[t]<0)
ans+=-1000000000*c[t]»c[t];
else
{
ans+=(rhocoefn/((double)R H O S))*((u[t]+v[t])-d[t]);
)
retum (ans);
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